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Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder
No. 12-96
Ruling Below: Shelby C01lnty, Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 20 12), petitionjor cert.
filed, 2012 WL 1759997 (U.S. 2012).
Shelby County, Alabama, filed a challenge to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging the Act exceeds Congress's enumerated
powers because the preclearance burdens imposed can no longer be justified and the geographic
coverage disparities are no longer sufficiently related to the targeted problem. The district court
found for the United States and granted summary judgment, upholding Section 5's
constitutionality as a "congment and propoliional remedy." The Court of Appeals for the D. C.
Circuit affirmed, upholding Section 5 under the "congmence and proportionality" standard and
deferring to Congress.
Question Presented: Whether Congress's decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights
Act exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.

SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, Appellant,

v.
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of the United States, et
aI., Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided May 18,2012
[Excerpt; some text, footnotes and citations
omitted.]
TATEL, Circuit Judge:
In Northwest A1Istin M1Inicipal Utility
District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193
(2009), the Supreme Court raised serious
questions
about
the
continued
constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Section 5 prohibits
certain "covered jurisdictions" from making
any change in their voting procedures
without first demonstrating to either the
Attorney General or a three-judge district

court in Washington that the change "neither
has the purpose nor will have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 42 U.S.c. §
1973c(a). The Supreme Court warned that
the burdens imposed by section 5 may no
longer be justified by current needs and that
its geographic coverage may no longer
sufficiently relate to the problem it targets.
Although the Court had no occasion to
resolve these questions, they are now
squarely before us. Shelby County,
Alabama, a covered jurisdiction, contends
that when Congress reauthorized section 5 in
2006, it exceeded its enumerated powers.
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The district court disagreed and granted
summary judgment for the Attorney
General. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we affirm.
I.
The Framers of our Constitution sought to
construct a federal government powerful
enough to function effectively yet limited
enough to preserve the hard-earned liberty
fought for in the War of Independence. They
feared not state government, but centralized
national government, long the hallmark of
Old World monarchies. As a result, "[t]he
powers delegated by the ... Constitution to
the federal government, are few and
defined," while "[t]hose which are to remain
in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite." The Federalist No. 45 (James
Madison) ....
But the experience of the nascent Republic,
divided by slavery, taught that states too
could threaten individual liberty. So after the
Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments
were added to the Constitution to limit state
power....
Following Reconstruction, however, "the
blight of racial discrimination in voting ...
infected the electoral process in parts of our
country for nearly a century." South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966). The courts and Congress eventually
responded. The Supreme Court struck down
grandfather clauses, Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915), and white primaries,
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Congress "enact[ ed] civil rights legislation
in 1957, 1960, and 1964, which sought to
'facilitat[e] case-by-case litigation against
voting discrimination.'" Shelby Cn ty. , 811
F.Supp.2d at 430. But Congress soon
determined that such measures were
inadequate: case-by-case litigation, In

addition to being expensive, was slowslow to come to a result and slow to respond
once a state switched from
one
discriminatory device to the next-and thus
had "done little to cure the problem of
voting discrimination." Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 313. Determined to "rid the country
of racial discrimination in voting," id. at
315, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.
Unlike prior legislation, the 1965 Act
combined a permanent, case-by-case
enforcement mechanism with a set of more
stringent, temporary remedies designed to
target those areas of the country where racial
discrimination in voting was concentrated ..

Reaching beyond case-by-case litigation and
"covered
applying only in
certain
jurisdictions," section 5-the focus of this
litigation-"prescribes remedies ... which
go into effect without any need for prior
adjudication." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 32728. Section 5 suspends "all changes in state
election procedure until they [are] submitted
to and approved by a three-judge Federal
District Court in Washington, D.C., or the
Attorney General." Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. at
2509. A jurisdiction seeking to change its
voting laws or procedures must either
submit the change to the Attorney General
or seek preclearance directly from the threejudge court. If it opts for the former and if
the Attorney General lodges no objection
within sixty days, the proposed law can take
effect. 42 U.S.c. § 1973c(a). But if the
Attorney General lodges an objection, the
submitting jurisdiction may either request
reconsideration, 28 C.F.R. § 51.45(a), or
seek a de novo determination from the threejudge district court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
Either way, preclearance may be granted
only if the jurisdiction demonstrates that the
proposed change to its voting law neither
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"has the purpose nor . . . the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." Jd.
Prior to section 5' s enactment, states could
stay ahead of plaintiffs and courts "'by
passing new discriminatory voting laws as
soon as the old ones had been struck
down.'" Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,
140 (1976). But section 5 "shift[ed] the
advantage of time and inertia from the
perpetrators of the evil to its victim."
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328. It did so by
placing "the burden on covered jurisdictions
to show their voting changes are
nondiscriminatory before those changes can
be put into effect." Shelby Cnty., 811
F.Supp.2d at 431. Section 5 thus "preempted the most powerful tools of black
disenfranchisement," Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct.
at 2509, resulting in "undeniable"
improvements in the protection of minority
voting rights, id. at 2511.
Section 4(b) contains a formula that, as
originally enacted, applied section 5's
preclearance requirements to any state or
political subdivision of a state that
"maintained a voting test or device as of
November 1, 1964, and had less than 50%
voter registration or turnout in the 1964
presidential election." Shelby Cnty., 811
F.Supp.2d at 432. Congress chose these
criteria carefully. It knew precisely which
states it sought to cover and crafted the
criteria to capture those jurisdictions. Jd.
Unsurprisingly, the jurisdictions originally
covered in their entirety, Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia, "were those southern states with
the worst historical records of racial
discrimination in voting." Jd.
Because section 4(b)'s formula could be
both over- and under-inclusive, Congress
incorporated two procedures for adjusting

coverage over time. First, as it existed in
1965, section 4(a) allowed jurisdictions to
earn exemption from coverage by obtaining
from a three-judge district court a
declaratory judgment that in the previous
five years (i.e., before they became subject
to the Act) they had used no test or device
"for the purpose or with the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 1965 Act § 4(a).
This "bailout" provision, as subsequently
amended,
addresses
potential
overinclusiveness, allowing jurisdictions
with clean records to terminate their section
5 preclearance obligations. Second, section
3(c) authorizes federal cOUlis to require
preclearance by any non-covered state or
political subdivision found to have violated
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 42
U.S.C. § 1973a(c). Specifically, courts
presiding over voting discrimination suits
may "retain jurisdiction for such period as
[they] may deem appropriate" and order that
during that time no voting change take effect
unless either approved by the cOUli or
unopposed by the Attorney General. Jd. This
judicial "bail-in" provision addresses the
formula's potential underinclusiveness.
As originally enacted in 1965, section 5 was
to remain in effect for five years. In SOllth
Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of section 5,
holding that its provisions "are a valid
means for carrying out the commands of the
Fifteenth Amendment." 383 U.S. at 337.
Congress
subsequently
renewed
the
temporary provisions, including sections
4(b) and 5, in 1970 (for five years), then in
1975 (for seven years), and again in 1982
(for twenty-five years). In each version,
"[t]he coverage formula [in section 4(b) ]
remained the same, based on the use of
voting-eligibility tests [or devices] and the
rate of registration and turnout among all
voters, but the pertinent dates for assessing
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these criteria moved from 1964 to include
1968 and eventually 1972." Nw. Austin, 129
S.Ct. at 2510. In 1975 Congress made one
significant change to section 4(b)'s scope: it
amended the definition of "test or device" to
include the practice of providing only
English-language voting materials in
jurisdictions with significant non-Englishspeaking populations. Act of Aug. 6, 1975,
Pub.L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 40102. Although not altering the basic coverage
formula, this change expanded section 4(b)'s
scope to encompass jurisdictions with
records of voting discrimination against
"language minorities." See Briscoe v. Bell,
432 U.S. 404, 405 (1977). The Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of each
extension, respectively, in Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), and
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266
(1999).
Significantly for the issue before us, the
1982 version of the Voting Rights Act made
bailout substantially more permissive. . . .
[A]fter 1982 the Act allowed bailout by any
jurisdiction with a "clean" voting rights
record over the previous ten years. ld. The
1982 reauthorization also permitted a greater
number of jurisdictions to seek bailout.
Previously, "only covered states (such as
Alabama) or separately-covered political
subdivisions (such as individual North
Carolina counties) were eligible to seek
bailout." ld.
After
1982,
political
subdivisions within a covered state could
bailout even if the state as a whole was
ineligible. ld.
Setting the stage for this litigation, Congress
extended the Voting Rights Act for another
twenty-five years in 2006 .... Congress also
amended section 5 to overrule the Supreme
COUli's decisions in Georgia v. Ashcroft,
539 U.S. 461, 479-80 (2003) and Reno v.

Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320,
328 (2000) ("Bossier 11").

The 2006 Act's constitutionality was
immediately challenged by "a small utility
district" subject to its provisions. See Nw.
A1Istin, 129 S.Ct. at 2508. . .. On appeal,
the Supreme Court identified two "serious ..
. questions" about section 5' s continued
constitutionality, namely, whether the
"current burdens" it imposes are "justified
by current needs," and whether its "disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related
to the problem that it targets." Nw. Austin,
129 S.Ct. at 2512-13. But invoking the
constitutional avoidance doctrine, id. at
2508, 2513, the Court interpreted the statute
to allow any covered jurisdiction, including
the utility district bringing suit in that case,
to seek bailout, thus avoiding the need to
resolve the "big question," id. at 2508: Did
Congress exceed its constitutional authority
when it reauthorized section 5? Now that
question is squarely presented.
II.

Shelby County filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, seeking
both a declaratory judgment that sections
4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are
facially unconstitutional and a permanent
injunction prohibiting the Attorney General
from enforcing them. Shelby Cnty., 811
F.Supp.2d at 427. Unlike the utility district
in Northwest A1Istin, Shelby County never
sought bailout, and for good reason. Because
the county had held several special elections
under a law for which it failed to seek
preclearance and because the Attorney
General
had
recently
objected
to
annexations and a redistricting plan
proposed by a city within Shelby County,
the County was clearly ineligible for bailout.
See id. at 446 n. 6. As the district cOUliJudge John D. Bates-recognized, the
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"serious constitutional questions" raised in
Northwest Austin could "no longer be
avoided." ld at 427.
Addressing these questions in a thorough
opinion, the district court upheld the
constitutionality
of
the
challenged
provisions and granted summary judgment
for the Attorney General. After reviewing
the extensive legislative record and the
arguments made by Shelby County, the
Attorney General, and a group of defendantintervenors, the district court concluded that
"Section 5 remains a 'congruent and
proportional remedy' to the 21 st century
problem of voting discrimination in covered
jurisdictions." ld at 428. Responding to the
Supreme Court's concerns in Northwest
Austin, the district court found the record
evidence of contemporary discrimination in
covered jurisdictions "plainly adequate to
justify section 5's strong remedial and
preventative measures," id at 492, and to
support Congress's predictive judgment that
failure to reauthorize section 5 '''would
leave minority citizens with the inadequate
remedy of a Section 2 action,'" id at 498.
This evidence consisted of thousands of
pages of testimony, reports, and data
regarding racial disparities in voter
registration, voter turnout, and electoral
success; the nature and number of section 5
objections; judicial preclearance suits and
section 5 enforcement actions; successful
section 2 litigation; the use of "more
information requests" and federal election
observers; racially polarized voting; and
section 5's deterrent effect.ld at 465-66.
As to section 4(b), the district court
acknowledged that the legislative record
"primarily focused on the persistence of
voting
discrimination
in
covered
jurisdictions-rather
than
on
the
comparative levels of voting discrimination
in covered and non-covered jurisdictions."

ld at 507. Nonetheless, the district comi
pointed to "several significant pieces of
evidence suggesting that the 21 st century
problem of voting discrimination remains
more prevalent in those jurisdictions that
have historically been subject to the
preclearance requirement"-including the
disproportionate number of successful
section 2 suits in covered jurisdictions and
the "continued prevalence of voting
discrimination in covered jurisdictions
notwithstanding the considerable deterrent
effect of Section 5." ld at 506-07. Thus,
although
observing
that
Congress's
reauthorization "ensured that Section 4(b)
would continue to focus on those
jurisdictions with the worst historical
records of voting discrimination," id at 506,
the district court found this continued focus
justified by
current evidence that
discrimination remained concentrated in
those jurisdictions. See id Finally, the
district court emphasized that Congress had
based reauthorization not on "a perfunctory
review of a few isolated examples of voting
discrimination by covered jurisdictions," but
had "'approached its task seriously and with
great care.'" ld at 496. Given this, the
district court concluded that Congress's
predictive judgment about the continued
need for section 5 in covered jurisdictions
was due "substantial deference," id at 498,
and therefore "decline[ d] to overturn
Congress's carefully considered judgment,"
id at 508. Our review is de novo. See
McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1379
(D.C.Cir.2012).

On appeal, Shelby County reiterates its
argument that, given the federalism costs
section 5 imposes, the provision can be
justified only by contemporary evidence of
the kind of "'unremitting and ingenious
defiance'" that existed when the Voting
Rights Act was originally passed in 1965.
Appellant's Br. 8. Insisting that the
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legislative record lacks "evidence of a
of
voting
systematic
campaign
discrimination and gamesmanship by the
covered jurisdictions," Shelby County
contends that section 5's remedy is
unconstitutional because it is no longer
congruent and proportional to the problem it
seeks to cure. lei. at 8-9. In addition, Shelby
County argues, section 4(b) contains an
"obsolete" coverage formula that fails to
identify the problem jurisdictions, and
because the jurisdictions it covers are not
uniquely problematic, the formula is no
longer rational '" in both practice and
theory.'" Appellant's Br. 11-12.

III.
Northwest Austin sets the course for our
analysis, directing us to conduct two
principal inquiries. First, emphasizing that
section 5 "authorizes federal intrusion into
sensitive areas of state and local
policymaking that imposes substantial
federalism costs," the Court made clear that
"[p ]ast success alone . . . is not adequate
justification to retain the preclearance
requirements."
129
S.Ct.
at 251l.
Conditions in the South, the COUli pointed
out, "have unquestionably improved": racial
disparities in voter registration and turnout
have diminished or disappeared, and
"minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels." lei. Of course, "[i]t
may be that these improvements are
insufficient and that conditions continue to
warrant preclearance under the Act." lei. at
2511-12. But "the Act imposes current
burdens," and we must determine whether
those burdens are "justified by current
needs." lei. at 2512.

Second, the Act, through section 4(b)'s
coverage formula, "differentiates between
the States, despite our historic tradition that

all the States enjoy equal sovereignty." lei.
And while equal sovereignty "'does not bar.
.. remedies for local evils, '" iel., the Court
warned that section 4(b)'s coverage formula
may "fail [ ] to account for current political
conditions"-that is, "[t]he evil that § 5 is
meant to address may no longer be
concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out
for preclearance." lei. These concerns, the
COUli explained, "are underscored by the
argument" that section 5 may require
covered jurisdictions to adopt raceconscious measures that, if adopted by noncovered jurisdictions, could violate section 2
of the Act or the Fourteenth Amendment. lei.
(Kennedy, 1., concurring). To be sure, such
"[ d] istinctions can be justified in some
cases." lei. But given section 5's serious
federalism costs, Northwest Austin requires
that we ask whether section 4(b)' s "disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related
to the problem that it targets." lei.
Before addressing Nortlnvest Austin's two
questions,
we
must
determine the
appropriate standard of review. As the
Supreme Court noted, the standard applied
to legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's
Fifteenth Amendment power remains
unsettled. See tel. at 2512-l3. Reflecting this
unceliainty, Shelby County argues that the
"congruence and propOliionality" standard
for Fourteenth Amendment legislation
applies, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520,
whereas the Attorney General insists that
Congress may use "any rational means" to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, see
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 .... We thus
read Northwest Austin as sending a powerful
signal that congruence and proportionality is
the appropriate standard of review. In any
event, if section 5 survives the arguably
more rigorous "congruent and propoliional"
standard, it would also survive Katzenbach's
"rationality" review ....
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We read this case law with two important
qualifications. First, we deal here with racial
discrimination in voting, one of the gravest
evils that Congress can seek to redress. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886). When Congress seeks to combat
racial discrimination in voting-protecting
both the right to be free from discrimination
based on race and the right to be free from
discrimination in voting, two rights subject
to heightened scrutiny-it acts at the apex of
its power. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736; Lane,
541 U.S. at 561-63. Expressly prohibited by
the
Fifteenth
Amendment,
racial
discrimination in voting is uniquely harmful
in several ways: it cannot be remedied by
money damages and, as Congress found,
lawsuits to enjoin discriminatory voting
laws are costly, take years to resolve, and
leave those elected under the challenged law
with the benefit of incumbency.
Second, although the federalism costs
imposed by the statutes at issue in Hibbs and
Lane are no doubt substantial, the federalism
costs imposed by section 5 are a great deal
more significant. To be sure, in most cases
the preclearance process is "routine" and
"efficient[ ]," resulting in prompt approval
by the Attorney General and rarely if ever
delaying elections. See Rea1lthorizing the
Voting Rights Act's Temporary Provisions:
Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 31213 (2006) (testimony of Donald M. Wright,
North Carolina State Board of Elections).
But section 5 sweeps broadly, requiring
preclearance of every voting change no
matter how minor. Section 5 also places the
burden on covered jurisdictions to
demonstrate to the Attorney General or a
three-judge district court here in Washington
that the proposed law is not discriminatory.
Given these significant burdens, in order to
determine whether section 5 remains
congruent and proportional we are obligated

to undertake a review of the record more
searching than the Supreme Court's review
in Hibbs and Lane.
Although our examination of the record will
be probing, we remain bound by
fundamental principles of judicial restraint.
Time and time again the Supreme Court has
emphasized that Congress's laws are entitled
to a "presumption of validity." City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535. As the Court has
explained, when Congress acts pursuant to
its enforcement authority under the
Reconstruction Amendments, its judgments
about "what legislation is needed . . . are
entitled to much deference." ld. ... And
critically for our purposes, although
Northwest Austin raises serious questions
about section 5' s constitutionality, nothing
in that opinion alters our duty to resolve
those questions using traditional principles
of deferential review. Indeed, the Court
reiterated not only that "judging the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress is
'the gravest and most delicate duty that [a
court] is called on to perform,'" Nw. Austin,
129 S.Ct. at 2513 (Holmes, J., concurring»,
but also that "[t]he Fifteenth Amendment
empowers 'Congress,' not the Court, to
determine in the first instance what
legislation is needed to enforce it," id.
A.

Guided by these principles, we begin with
Northwest Austin's first question: Are the
current burdens imposed by section 5
"justified by current needs"? 129 S.Ct. at
2512. The Supreme Court raised this
question because, as it emphasized and as
Shelby County argues, the conditions which
led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act
"have unquestionably improved[,] . . . no
doubt due in significant part to the Voting
Rights Act itself." ld. at 2511. Congress also
recognized
this
progress
when
it
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reauthorized the Act, finding that "many of
the first generation barriers to minority voter
registration and voter turnout that were in
place prior to the [Voting Rights Act] have
been eliminated." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at
12. The dissent's charts nicely display this
progress. Racial disparities in voter
registration and turnout have "narrowed
considerably" in covered jurisdictions and
are now largely comparable to disparities
nationwide.ld. at 12-17; see also Dissenting
Op. at 890-91 figs. I & II. Increased
minority voting, in turn, has "resulted in
significant increases in the number of
African-Americans serving in elected
offices." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 18; see
also Dissenting Op. at 892 fig.III. For
example, in the six states fully covered by
the 1965 Act, the number of African
Americans serving in elected office
increased from 345 to 3700 in the decades
since 1965. H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 18.
But Congress found that this progress did
not tell the whole story. It documented
"continued
registration
and
turnout
disparities" in both Virginia and South
Carolina. ld. at 25. Virginia, in particular,
"remain[ed] an outlier," S.Rep. No. 109295, at 11 (2006): although 71.6 percent of
white, non-Hispanic voting age residents
registered to vote in 2004, only 57.4 percent
of black voting age residents registered, a
14.2-point difference. U.S. Census Bureau,
Reported Voting and Registration of the
Total Voting-Age Population, at tb1.4a.
Also, although the number of African
Americans holding elected office had
increased significantly, they continued to
face barriers to election for statewide
positions. Congress found that not one
African American had yet been elected to
statewide office in Mississippi, Louisiana, or
South Carolina ....

Congress considered other types of evidence
that, in its judgment, "show[ ed] that
attempts to discriminate persist and evolve,
such that Section 5 is still needed to protect
minority voters in the future." ld. at 21. It
heard accounts of specific instances of racial
discrimination in voting. It heard analysis
and opinions by experts on all sides of the
issue. It considered, among other things, six
distinct categories of evidence: (1) Attorney
General objections issued to block proposed
voting changes that would, in the Attorney
General's judgment, have the purpose or
effect of discriminating against minorities;
(2) "more information requests" issued
when the Attorney General believes that the
information submitted by a covered
jurisdiction is insufficient to allow a
preclearance determination; (3) successful
lawsuits brought under section 2 of the Act;
(4) federal observers dispatched to monitor
elections under section 8 of the Act; (5)
successful section 5 enforcement actions
filed against covered jurisdictions for failing
to submit voting changes for preclearance,
as well as requests for preclearance denied
by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia; and (6) evidence that
the mere existence of section 5 deters
officials from even proposing discriminatory
voting changes. Finally, Congress heard
evidence that case-by-case section 2
litigation was inadequate to remedy the
racial discrimination in voting that persisted
in covered jurisdictions.
Before delving into the legislative record
ourselves, we consider two arguments raised
by Shelby County that, if meritorious, would
significantly affect how we evaluate that
record. First, Shelby County argues that
section 5 can be sustained only on the basis
of current evidence of "a widespread pattern
of electoral
gamesmanship showing
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systematic resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment."
Appellant's
Br.
23.
According to the County, the preclearance
remedy may qualify as congruent and
proportional only "when it addresses a
coordinated campaign of discrimination
intended to circumvent the remedial effects
of direct enforcement of Fifteenth
Amendment voting rights." Id. at 7. We
disagree . . . . Shelby County's argument
rests on a misreading of Katzenbach.
Although the COUli did describe the
situation in 1965 as one of "unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution,"
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309, nothing in
Katzenbach
suggests
that
such
gamesmanship was necessary to the Court's
judgment that section 5 was constitutional.
Rather, the critical factor was that "Congress
had found that case-by-case litigation was
inadequate to combat widespread and
persistent discrimination in voting." Id. at
328; see also id. at 313-15 ....
Second, Shelby County urges us to disregard
much of the evidence Congress considered
because it involves "vote dilution, going to
the weight of the vote once cast, not access
to the ballot." Appellant's Br. 26 . . . .
According to the County, because the
Supreme Comi has "never held that vote
dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment,"
Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 334 n. 3, we may not
rely on such evidence to sustain section 5 as
a valid exercise of Congress's Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power.
It is true that neither the Supreme Court nor
this court has ever held that intentional vote
dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment.
But the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
vote dilution intended "invidiously to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential
of racial or ethnic minorities." City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
Although the Court's previous decisions

upholding section 5 focused on Congress's
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,
the same "congruent and proportional"
standard, refined by the inquiries set forth in
Northwest A1Istin, appears to apply
"irrespective of whether Section 5 is
considered
[Fifteenth
Amendment]
enforcement
legislation,
[FoUlieenth
Amendment] enforcement legislation, or a
kind of hybrid legislation enacted pursuant
to both amendments." Shelby Cnty., 811
F.Supp.2d
at
462.
Indeed,
when
reauthorizing the Act in 2006, Congress
expressly invoked its enforcement authority
under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. See H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at
90; id. at 53 & n. 136, 100 S.Ct. 1490.
Accordingly, like Congress and the district
comi, we think it appropriate to consider
evidence of unconstitutional vote dilution in
evaluating section 5's validity. See City of
Rome, 446 U.S. at 181.
Having resolved these threshold issues, we
return to the basic question: Does the
legislative
record
contain
sufficient
probative evidence from which Congress
could reasonably conclude that racial
discrimination in voting in covered
jurisdictions is so serious and pervasive that
section 2 litigation remains an inadequate
remedy? Reviewing the record ourselves
and focusing on the evidence most probative
of ongoing constitutional violations, we
believe it does.
To begin with, the record contains numerous
"examples of modern instances" of racial
discrimination in voting, City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 530. Just a few recent examples:
•

Kilmichael, Mississippi's abrupt
2001 decision to cancel an election
when "an unprecedented number" of
African Americans ran for office,
H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 36-37;
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•

Webster County, Georgia's 1998
proposal to reduce the black
population in three of the education
board's five single-member districts
after the school district elected a
majority black school board for the
first time, Voting Rights Act:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Judiciary
Comm., 109th Congo 830-31 (2006);

The legislative record also contains
examples of overt hostility to black voting
power by those who control the electoral
process .... In addition to these examples of
flagrant racial discrimination, several
categories of evidence in the record support
Congress's conclusion that intentional racial
discrimination in voting remains so serious
and widespread in covered jurisdictions that
section 5 preclearance is still needed. We
explore each in turn.
First, Congress documented hundreds of
instances in which the Attorney General,
acting pursuant to section 5, objected to
proposed voting changes that he found
would have a discriminatory purpose or
effect. Significantly, Congress found that the
absolute number of objections has not
declined since the 1982 reauthorization: the
Attorney General interposed at least 626
objections during the twenty-two years from
1982 to 2004 (an average of28.5 each year),
compared to 490 interposed during the
seventeen years from 1965 to 1982 (an
average of 28.8 each year). Evidence of
Continued Need 172.
Formal objections were not the only way the
Attorney General blocked potentially
discriminatory changes under section 5.
Congress found that between 1990 and
2005, "more information requests" (MIRs)
prompted covered jurisdictions to withdraw
or modify over 800 proposed voting

changes. . . . Congress found that because
"[t]he actions taken by a jurisdiction [in
response to an MIR] are often illustrative of
[its] motives," the high number of
withdrawals and modifications made in
response to MIRs constitutes additional
evidence of "[ e]ff011s to discriminate over
the past 25 years." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478,
at 40-41.
Shelby County contends that section 5
objections and MIRs, however numerous,
"do[ ] not signal intentional voting
discrimination" because they represent only
the Attorney General's opinion and need not
be based on discriminatory intent.
Appellant's Br. 30-31. Underlying this
argument is a fundamental principle with
which we agree: to sustain section 5, the
record must contain "evidence of a pattern
of constitutional violations," Hibbs, 538
U.S. at 729, and voting changes violate the
if motivated
by
constitution
only
discriminatory animus, Reno v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 481 (1997)
("Bossier I "). Although not all objections
rest on an affirmative finding of intentional
discrimination, the record contains examples
of many that do. See Nw. Austin, 573
F.Supp.2d at 289-301. ... Moreover, in the
1990s, before the Supreme Court limited the
Attorney General's ability to object based on
discriminatory but non-retrogressive intent,
see Bossier 11, 528 U.S. 320, "the purpose
prong of Section 5 had become the dominant
legal basis for objections," Preclearance
Standards 177 ....
Shelby County also points out that the
percentage of proposed voting changes
blocked by Attorney General objections has
steadily declined. An Introduction to the
Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act
and
Legal
Issues
Relating
to
Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the J1Idiciary, 109th Congo 219
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(2006). But the most dramatic decline in the
objection rate-which, as the district court
observed, "has always been low," Shelby
Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2d at 470-occurred in
the 1970s, before the Supreme Court upheld
the Act for a third time in City of Rome. See
Introd1lction to the Expiring Provisions 219.
. . . As the district court pointed out, there
may be "many plausible explanations for the
recent decline in objection rates." See Shelby
Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2dat471. ...
As for MIRs, we agree with Shelby County
that they are less probative of discrimination
than objections. An MIR does not represent
a judgment on the merits, and submitting
jurisdictions might have many reasons for
modifying or withdrawing a proposed
change in response to one. But the record
contains evidence from which Congress
could "reasonabl[y] infer[ ]," id., that at least
some withdrawals or modifications reflect
the
submitting
jurisdiction's
acknowledgement that the proposed change
was discriminatory. See Evidence of
Continlled Need 178, 809-10; H.R.Rep. No.
lO9-478, at 41. Given this, Congress
reasonably concluded that some of the 800plus withdrawals and modifications in
response to MIRs "reflect[ ]" "[ e]fforts to
discriminate over the past 25 years."
H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 40.
The second category of evidence relied on
by Congress, successful section 2 litigation,
reinforces the pattern of discrimination
revealed by objections and MIRs. The
record shows that between 1982 and 2005,
minority plaintiffs obtained favorable
outcomes in some 653 section 2 suits filed in
covered jurisdictions, providing relief from
discriminatory voting practices in at least
825 counties. Evidence of Continued Need
208, 251. Shelby County faults the district
court for relying on evidence of successful
section 2 litigation "even though 'a violation

of Section 2 does not require a showing of
unconstitutional discriminatory intent. ",
Appellant's Br. 34. The County's premise is
correct: although the Constitution prohibits
only those voting laws motivated by
discriminatory intent, section 2 prohibits all
voting laws for which "'based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision
are not equally open to participation by
members of a [protected] class. ", Bartlett v.
Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2009). In
practice, however, this "results test," as
applied in section 2 cases, requires
consideration of factors very similar to those
used to establish discriminatory intent based
on circumstantial evidence. Compare
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36, with Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Also, as the
district cOUli pointed out, "coutiS will avoid
deciding constitutional questions" if, as is
the case in virtually all successful section 2
actions, the litigation can be resolved on
narrower grounds. Shelby Cnty., 811
F.Supp.2d at 482. This explains why the
legislative record contains so few published
section 2 cases with judicial findings of
discriminatory intent, see Dissenting Op. at
26;)-courts have no need to find
discriminatory intent once they find
discriminatory effect. But Congress is not so
limited. Considering the evidence required
to prevail in a section 2 case and accounting
for the obligation of Article III courts to
avoid reaching constitutional questions
unless necessary, we think Congress quite
reasonably concluded that successful section
2 suits provide powerful evidence of
unconstitutional discrimination. In addition,
as with Attorney General objections, we
cannot ignore the sheer number of
successful section 2 cases. This high volume
of successful section 2 actions is particularly
dramatic given that Attorney General
objections block discriminatory laws before
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they can be implemented and that section 5
deters jurisdictions from even attempting to
enact such laws, thereby reducing the need
for section 2 litigation in covered
jurisdictions. See Continlling Need 26.
Third, Congress relied on evidence of "the
tens of thousands of Federal observers that
have been dispatched to observe elections in
covered jurisdictions." 2006 Act § 2(b)( 5) ..
Of these, sixty-six percent were
concentrated in five of the six states
originally covered by section 5-Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina. H.R.Rep. No. 109--478, at 44. In
some instances, monitoring by federal
observers "bec[ arne] the foundation of
Department of Justice enforcement efforts."
Jd. As Congress saw it, this continued need
for federal observers in covered jurisdictions
IS
indicative of discrimination and
"demonstrates that the discriminatory
conduct experienced by minority voters is
not solely limited to tactics to dilute the
voting strength of minorities but continues
to include tactics to disenfranchise, such as
harassment and intimidation inside polling
locations." H.R.Rep. No.1 09--478, at 44.
. . . The record shows that federal observers
in fact witnessed discrimination at the polls,
sometimes in the form of intentional
harassment, intimidation, or disparate
treatment of minority voters. See id. at 3031, 34, 43. Thus, although the deployment
of federal observers is hardly conclusive
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination,
we think Congress could reasonably rely
upon it as modest, additional evidence of
CUlTent needs.
Fourth, Congress found evidence of
continued discrimination in two types of
preclearance-related lawsuits. Examining the
first of these-actions brought to enforce
secti on 5' s preclearance requirement-

Congress noted that "many defiant covered
jurisdictions and State and local officials
continue to enact and enforce changes to
voting procedures without the Federal
Government's knowledge." H.R.Rep. No.
109--478, at 41. ...
Congress could reasonably have concluded
that such cases, even if few in number,
provide at least some evidence of continued
Fifteenth
willingness to evade the
Amendment's protections, for they reveal
continued effOlis by recalcitrant jurisdictions
not only to enact discriminatory voting
changes, but to do so in defiance of section
5' s preclearance requirement.
In addition to section 5 enforcement suits,
Congress found evidence of continued
discrimination in "the number of requests
for declaratory judgments [for preclearance]
denied by the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia." 2006 Act §
2(b)(4)(B). The number of unsuccessful
judicial preclearance actions appears to have
remained roughly constant since 1966:
twenty-five requests were denied or
withdrawn between 1982 and 2004,
compared to seventeen between 1966 and
1982. Evidence of Continlled Need 177-78,
275. Shelby County does not contest the
relevance of this evidence.
Finally, and bolstering its conclusion that
section 5 remains necessary, Congress
"f[ ound] that the existence of Section 5
deterred covered jurisdictions from even
attempting to enact discriminatory voting
changes." H.R.Rep. No. 109--478, at 24. In
Congress's view, "Section 5's strong
deterrent effect" and "the number of voting
changes that have never gone forward as a
result of [that effect]" are "[a]s important as
the number of objections that have been
interposed to protect minority voters against
discriminatory changes" that had actually
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been proposed. Id. As Congress explained,
'" [0 ]nce officials in covered jurisdictions
become aware of the logic of preclearance,
they tend to understand that submitting
discriminatory changes is a waste of
taxpayer time and money and interferes with
their own timetables, because the chances
are good that an objection will result. '" Id.
For this reason, the mere existence of
section 5 "encourage[ s] the legislature to
ensure that any voting changes would not
have a discriminatory effect on minority
voters, and that it would not become
embroiled in the preclearance process." Id. .
.. Congress had "some reason to believe that
without [section 5' s] deterrent effect on
potential misconduct," the evidence of
continued
discrimination
m
covered
jurisdictions "might be considerably worse."
S.Rep. No.1 09-295, at 11.
Shelby County argues that Congress's
finding of deterrence reflects '''outdated
assumptions about racial attitudes in the
covered jurisdictions '" that we should not
"indulge[ ]''' Appellant's Br. 38 (Thomas, 1.,
concurrmg in judgment in part and
dissenting in part)). We agree that
evaluating section 5 's deterrent effect raises
sensitive and difficult issues . . . . We also
agree with the dissent that section 5 could
not stand based on claims of deterrence
alone, nor could deterrence be used in some
hypothetical case to justify renewal "to the
crack of doom," id. But the difficulty of
quantifying the statute's deterrent effect is
no reason to summarily reject Congress's
finding that the evidence of racial
discrimination in voting would look worse
without section 5-a finding that flows from
record evidence unchallenged by the dissent.
As explained above, Congress's deterrent
effect finding rests on evidence of current
and widespread voting discrimination, as
well as on testimony indicating that section
5's mere existence prompts state and local

legislators to conform their conduct to the
law. And Congress's finding-that is, a
finding about how the world would have
looked absent section 5-rests on precisely
the type of fact-based, predictive judgment
that courts are ill-equipped to second guess.
See Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195.
This brings us, then, to Congress's ultimate
conclusion. After considering the entire
record, including
•

•
•

•

•

626 Attorney General objections that
blocked
discriminatory
voting
changes;
653 successful section 2 cases;
over 800 proposed voting changes
withdrawn or modified in response
to MIRs;
tens of thousands of observers sent to
covered jurisdictions;
105 successful section 5 enforcement
actions;
25 unsuccessful judicial preclearance
actions;
and section 5' s strong deterrent
effect, i.e., "the number of voting
changes that have never gone
forward as a result of Section 5,"
H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 24;

Congress found that serious and widespread
intentional discrimination persisted in
covered jurisdictions and that "case-by-case
enforcement alone ... would leave minority
citizens with [an] inadequate remedy." Id. at
57. In reaching this conclusion, Congress
considered evidence that section 2 claims
involve "intensely complex litigation that is
both costly and time-consuming." Modern
Enforcement 96; see also Introd1lction to the
Expiring Provisions; City of Boerne, 521
U.S at 526. It heard from witnesses who
explained that "it is incredibly difficult for
minority voters to pull together the resources
needed" to pursue a section 2 lawsuit,
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particularly at the local level and in rural
communities. Modern Enforcement 96; see
also History, Scope, and P1lrpose 84. . . .
Given all of this, and given the magnitude
and persistence of discrimination in covered
jurisdictions, Congress concluded that caseby-case litigation-slow, costly, and lacking
section 5's prophylactic effect-"would be
ineffective to protect the rights of minority
voters." H.R.Rep. No. 109-478, at 57.
According to Shelby County, "[ e]valuation
of the probative evidence shows there is no
longer systematic resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment in the covered jurisdictions that
cannot be solved through case-by-case
litigation." Appellant's Br. 38. Congress,
however, reached a different conclusion, and
as explained above, the County has offered
no basis for thinking that Congress's
judgment is either unreasonable or
unsupported by probative evidence ....
The point at which section 5's strong
medicine
becomes
unnecessary
and
therefore no longer congruent and
proportional turns on several critical
considerations, including the pervasiveness
of serious racial discrimination in voting in
covered jurisdictions; the continued need for
section 5's deterrent and blocking effect;
and the adequacy of section 2 litigation.
These are quintessentially legislative
judgments, and Congress, after assembling
and analyzing an extensive record, made its
decision: section 5's work is not yet done.
Insofar as Congress's conclusions rest on
predictive judgments, we must, contrary to
the dissent's approach, apply a standard of
review even "more deferential than we
accord to judgments of an administrative
agency." T1lrner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195.
Given that we may not "displace [an
agency's] choice between two fairly
conflicting views, even though the court
would justifiably have made a different

choice had the matter been before it de
novo," Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951), we certainly
cannot do so here. Of course, given the
heavy federalism costs that section 5
imposes, our job is to ensure that Congress's
judgment is reasonable and rests on
substantial probative evidence. See T1lrner
Broad., 520 U.S. at 195. After thoroughly
scrutinizing the record and given that overt
racial discrimination persists in covered
jurisdictions notwithstanding decades of
section 5 preclearance, we, like the district
court, are satisfied that Congress's judgment
deserves judicial deference.
B.

Having concluded that section 5's "current
burdens" are indeed justified by "current
needs," we proceed to the second Northwest
A1Istin inquiry: whether the record supports
the requisite "showing that a statute's
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets." 129
S.Ct. at 2512. Recall that this requirement
stems from the Court's concern that "[t]he
Act . . . differentiates between the States,
despite our historic tradition that all the
States enjoy 'equal sovereignty.'" ld. "The
evil that § 5 is meant to address," the Court
observed, "may no longer be concentrated in
the jurisdictions singled out [by section 4(b)]
for preclearance." ld.
Before examining the record ourselves, we
emphasize that the Act's disparate
geographic coverage-and its relation to the
problem of voting discrimination-depends
not only on section 4(b)'s formula, but on
the statute as a whole, including its
mechanisms for bail-in and bailout. . . .
[T]he question before us is whether the
statute as a whole, not just the section 4(b)
formula, ensures that jurisdictions subject to
section 5 are those in which unconstitutional
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voting discrimination is concentrated.
The most concrete evidence comparing
covered and non-covered jurisdictions in the
legislative record comes from a study of
section 2 cases published on Westlaw or
Lexis between 1982 and 2004. Impact and
Effectiveness 964-1124 (report by Ellen
Katz et al.). Known as the Katz study, it
reached two key findings suggesting that
racial discrimination in voting remains
"concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out
for preclearance," Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. at
2512. First, the study found that of the 114
published decisions resulting in outcomes
favorable to minority plaintiffs, 64
originated in covered jurisdictions, while
only 50 originated in non-covered
jurisdictions. . . . Second, the study found
higher success rates in covered jurisdictions
than in non-covered jurisdictions. Impact
and Effectiveness 974.
The difference between covered and noncovered jurisdictions becomes even more
pronounced when unpublished section 2
decisions-primarily
court-approved
settlements-are taken into account. As the
Katz study noted, published section 2
lawsuits "represent only a portion of the
section 2 claims filed or decided since 1982"
since many claims were settled or otherwise
resolved without a published opinion. Id. at
974 ....
The section 2 data, moreover, does not tell
the whole story. As explained above,
Congress found that section 5, which
operates only in covered jurisdictions, deters
or blocks many discriminatory voting laws
before they can ever take effect and become
the target of section 2 litigation. "Section 5's
reach in preventing discrimination is broad.
Its strength lies not only in the number of
discriminatory voting changes it has

thwarted, but can also be measured by the
submissions that have been withdrawn from
consideration, the submissions that have
been altered by jurisdictions in order to
comply with the [Voting Rights Act], or in
the discriminatory voting changes that have
never materialized." H.R. Rep. No. 109478, at 36. Accordingly, if discrimination
were evenly distributed throughout the
nation, we would expect to see fewer
successful section 2 cases in covered
jurisdictions
than
in
non-covered
jurisdictions. See Continuing Need 26. Yet
we see substantially more ....
Of course, Shelby County's real argument is
that the statute fails this test, i.e., that it no
longer actually identifies the jurisdictions
"uniquely interfering with the right
Congress is seeking to protect through
preclearance." Appellant's Br. 62 ....
Shelby County's first point-that Congress
failed to make a finding-is easily
answered. Congress did not have to. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
The proper question is whether the record
contains sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that the formula continues to target
jurisdictions with the most serious problems.
See Nw. Austin, 129 S.Ct. at 2512. This
presents a close question. The record on this
issue is less robust than the evidence of
continued discrimination, see supra Part
IILA, although this is in part due to the
difficulty of comparing jurisdictions that
have been subject to two very different
enforcement
regimes,
i.e.,
covered
jurisdictions are subject to both sections 2
and 5 while non-covered jurisdictions are
subject only to section 2. And although the
Katz data in the aggregate does suggest that
discrimination is concentrated in covered
jurisdictions, just three covered statesAlabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi-
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account for much of the disparity ....
[H]owever, this data presents an incomplete
picture of covered jurisdictions. When we
consider the Katz data in conjunction with
other record evidence, the picture looks
quite different. .
[E]ven if only a
relatively small portion of objections,
withdrawn voting changes, and successful
section 5 enforcement actions correspond to
unconstitutional conduct, and even if there
are
substantially
more
successful
unpublished section 2 cases in non-covered
jurisdictions than the McCrary data reveals,
these middle-range covered jurisdictions
appear to be engaged in much more
unconstitutional discrimination compared to
non-covered jurisdictions than the Katz data
alone suggests. In fact, the discrepancy
between
covered
and
non-covered
jurisdictions is likely even greater given
that, as Congress found, the mere existence
of section 5 deters unconstitutional behavior
in the covered jurisdictions ....
To be sure, the coverage formula's fit is not
perfect. But the fit was hardly perfect in
1965. Accordingly, Katzenbach's discussion
of this issue offers a helpful guide for our
current inquiry, particularly when we
consider all probative record evidence of
recent discrimination-and not just the
small subset of section 2 cases relied upon
by the dissent, see Dissenting Op. at 898-99.
In 1965, the formula covered three states in
"which federal courts ha[ d] repeatedly found
substantial
voting
discrimination"Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi,
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329, the same three
states that, notwithstanding more than fOlty
years of section 5 enforcement, still account
for the highest rates of published successful
section 2 litigation, as well as large numbers
of unpublished successful section 2 cases,
section 5 objections, federal observer
coverages, and voting changes withdrawn or

modified in response to MIRs. But the 1965
formula also "embrace[ d] two other StatesGeorgia and South Carolina-plus large
portions of a third State-North Carolinafor which there was more fragmentary
evidence of recent voting discrimination
mainly adduced by the Justice Depmtment
and the Civil Rights Commission." Jd. at
329-30. Today, the middle-range covered
jurisdictions-NOlth
Carolina,
South
Carolina, Virginia, Texas, and Georgialook similar: although the legislative record
contains fewer judicial findings of racial
discrimination in these states, it contains at
least fragmentary evidence, in part based on
Attorney General objections, that these
states continue to engage in unconstitutional
racial discrimination in voting. Finally, the
1965 formula swept in several other
jurisdictions-including Alaska, Virginia,
and counties in Arizona, Hawaii, and
Idaho-for which Congress apparently had
no evidence of actual voting discrimination.
See id. at 318. Today, the Act likewise
encompasses jurisdictions for which there is
some
evidence
of
continued
discrimination-Arizona and the covered
counties of California, Florida, and New
York, see Evidence of Continlled Need 25051, 272-as well as jurisdictions for which
there appears little or no evidence of current
problems-Alaska and a few towns in
Michigan and New Hampshire.
Critically, moreover, and as noted above, in
determining
whether
section
5
is
"sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets," we look not just at the section 4(b)
formula, but at the statute as a whole,
including its provisions for bail-in and
bailout. Bail-in allows jurisdictions not
captured by section 4's coverage formula,
but which nonetheless discriminate in
voting, to be subjected to section 5
preclearance. Thus, two non-covered states
with high numbers of successful published
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and unpublished section 2 cases-Arkansas
and New Mexico--were subjected to partial
preclearance under the bail-in provision. See
Jeffers, 740 F.Supp. at 601; Crum, 119 Yale
LJ. at 2010. Federal courts have also bailed
in jurisdictions in several states. See Crum,
119 Yale L.J. at 2010 & nn.102-08.
Bailout plays an even more important role in
ensuring that section 5 covers only those
jurisdictions with the worst records of racial
discrimination in voting. As the Supreme
COUli explained in City of Boerne, the
availability of bailout "reduce[ s] the
possibility of overbreadth" and helps
"ensure Congress' means are propOliionate
to [its] ends." 521 U.S. at 533. As of May 9,
2012, having demonstrated that they no
longer discriminate in voting,
136
jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions had bailed
out, including 30 counties, 79 towns and
cities, 21 school boards, and 6 utility or
sanitary districts. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. In fact,
by ruling in Northwest A1Istin that any
jurisdiction covered by section 5 could seek
bailout-a development unmentioned by the
dissent-the Supreme Court increased
significantly the extent to which bailout
helps "ensure Congress' means are
propOliionate to [its] ends," Boerne, 521
U.S. at 533. Not surprisingly, then, the pace
of bailout increased after Northwest A1Istin:
of the successful bailout actions since 1965,
30 percent occurred in the three years after
the Supreme Court issued its decision in
2009. See DOJ Bailout List. Also, the
Attorney General "has a number of active
bailout investigations, encompassing more
than 100 jurisdictions and subjurisdictions
from a range of States." Br. for Att'y Gen.
as Appellee at 47-48, LaRoq1le v. Holder,
679 F.3d 905 (D.C.Cir.2012) . . . . The
importance of this significantly liberalized
bailout mechanism cannot be overstated.
Underlying the debate over the continued

need for section 5 is a judgment about when
covered jurisdictions-many with very bad
historic records of racial discrimination in
voting-have changed enough so that caseby-case section 2 litigation is adequate to
protect the right to vote. Bailout embodies
Congress's judgment on this question:
jurisdictions originally covered because of
their histories of discrimination can escape
section 5 preclearance by demonstrating a
clean record on voting rights for ten years in
a row. See 42 U.S.c. § 1973b(a)(1). As the
House Report states, "covered status has
been and continues to be within the control
of the jurisdiction such that those
jurisdictions that have a genuinely clean
record and want to terminate coverage have
the ability to do so." H.R.Rep. No.1 09-478,
at 25. Bailout thus helps to ensure that
section 5 is "sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets," Nw. A1Istin, 129
S.Ct. at 2512.
This, then, brings us to the critical question:
Is the statute's "disparate geographic
coverage . . . sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets"? Nw. A1Istin, 129
S.Ct. at 2512. Of course, if the statute
produced "a remarkably bad fit," Dissenting
Op. at 898-99, then we would agree that it is
no longer congruent and proportional. But as
explained above, although the section 4(b)
formula relies on old data, the legislative
record shows that it, together with the
statute's provisions for bail-in and bailouthardly "tack[ ed] on," id. at 901 (internal
quotation marks omitted), but rather an
integral pati of the coverage mechanismcontinues to single out the jurisdictions in
which discrimination is concentrated. Given
this, and given the fundamental principle
that we may not "strik[ e] down an Act of
Congress except upon a clear showing of
unconstitutionality," Salazar v. Buono, 130
S.Ct. 1803 (2010) (plurality opinion), we see
no principled basis for setting aside the
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district court's conclusion that section 5 is
"sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets," Nw. A1Istin, 129 S.Ct. at2512 ....

IV.
In Northwest A1Istin, the Supreme Court
signaled that the extraordinary federalism
costs imposed by section 5 raise substantial
constitutional concerns. As a lower federal
court urged to strike this duly enacted law of
Congress, we must proceed with great
caution, bound as we are by Supreme Court
precedent and confined as we must be to
resolve only the precise legal question
before us: Does the severe remedy of
preclearance
remain
"congruent
and
proportional"? The legislative record is by
no means unambiguous. But Congress drew
reasonable conclusions from the extensive
evidence it gathered and acted pursuant to
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
which entrust Congress with ensuring that
the right to vote-surely among the most
important guarantees of political liberty in
the Constitution-is not abridged on account
of race. In this context, we owe much
deference to the considered judgment of the
People's elected representatives. We affirm.

contemplated change in election procedures,
however trivial. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
Alternatively, it can seek approval from a
three-judge district court in the District of
Columbia. See id. Below I'll address the
criteria by which the Department and courts
assess these proposals; for now, suffice it to
say that the act not only switches the burden
of proof to the supplicant jurisdiction, but
also applies substantive standards quite
different from those governing the rest of
the nation.

Judge,

Section 4(b) of the act states two criteria by
which jurisdictions are chosen for this
special treatment: whether a jurisdiction had
(1) a "test or device" restricting the
opportunity to register or vote and (2) a
voter registration or turnout rate below 50%.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). But § 4(b)
specifies that the elections for which these
two criteria are measured must be ones that
took place several decades ago. The
freshest, most recent data relate to
conditions in November 1972-34 years
before Congress extended the act for another
25 years (and thus 59 years before the
extension's scheduled expiration). See id.
The oldest data-and a jurisdiction included
because of the oldest data is every bit as
covered as one condemned under the
newest-are another eight years older. See
id.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act imposes
rather extraordinary burdens on "covered"
jurisdictions-nine states
(and
every
jurisdiction therein), plus a host of
jurisdictions scattered through several other
states. See Voting Section, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions.
Unless and until released from coverage (a
process discussed below), each of these
jurisdictions must seek the Justice
Department's
approval
for
every

Of course sometimes a skilled dart-thrower
can hit the bull's eye throwing a dart
backwards over his shoulder. As I will try to
show below, Congress hasn't proven so
adept. Whether the criteria are viewed in
absolute terms (are they adequate in
themselves to justify the extraordinary
burdens of § 5?) or in relative ones (do they
draw a rational line between covered and
uncovered jurisdictions?), they seem to me
defective. They are not, in my view,
"congruent and proportional," as required by

So ordered.

WILLIAMS,
dissenting:

Senior

Circuit
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controlling Supreme Court precedent. My
colleagues find they are. I dissent.

***
Although it is only the irrational coverage
formula of § 4(b) that I find
unconstitutional, it is impossible to assess
that formula without first looking at the
burdens § 5 imposes on covered
jurisdictions. Any answer to the question
whether § 4(b) is "sufficiently related to the
problem it targets," Northwest A1Istin
Municipal Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009), that is, whether it is
"congruent and proportional," must be
informed by the consequences triggered by §
4(b) ....
[Section] 5 requires much more than notice.
For covered jurisdictions, it mandates
anticipatory review of state legislative or
administrative acts, requiring state and local
officials to go hat in hand to Justice
Department officialdom to seek approval of
any and all proposed voting changes. See 42
U.S.c. § 1973c(a). When it first upheld the
VRA, the Supreme Court recognized it as a
"complex scheme of stringent remedies" and
§ 5 in particular as an "uncommon exercise
of congressional power." South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). And
only a few years ago the Supreme Court
reminded us that the federalism costs of § 5
are "substantial." Northwest Austin, 129
S.Ct. at 2511.
A critical aspect of those costs is the shifted
burden of proof (a matter I'll discuss below
in the realm of its most significant
application). So too is the section's broad
sweep: § 5 applies to any voting change
proposed by a covered jurisdiction, without
regard to kind or magnitude, and thus
governs many laws that likely could never
"deny or abridge" a "minority group's

opportunity to vote." See 42 U.S.c. §
1973c(a); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969) .... In the vast majority of
cases, then, the overall effect of § 5 is
merely to delay implementation of a
perfectly proper law.
Of course the most critical features of § 5
are the substantive standards it applies to the
covered jurisdictions. In practice this
standard requires a jurisdiction not only to
engage in some level of race-conscious
decision-making, but also on occasion to
sacrifice principles aimed at depoliticizing
redistricting ....
[In 2006,] New subsections (b) and (d) were
added to § 5 to overturn Georgia v. Ashcroft,
thereby restricting the flexibility of states to
experiment with different methods of
maintaining (and perhaps even expanding)
minority influence ....
Preclearance now has an exclusive focuswhether the plan diminishes the ability of
minorities (always assumed to be a
monolith) to "elect their preferred
candidates of choice," irrespective of
whether policymakers (including minority
ones) decide that a group's long-term
interests might be better served by less
concentration-and thus less of the political
isolation that concentration spawns. See 42
U.S.c. § 1973c(b); td. § 1973c(d). The
amended § 5 thus not only mandates raceconscious decisionmaking, but a paIiicular
brand of it. In doing so, the new § 5
aggravates both the federal-state tension
with which Northwest A1lstin was concerned
and the tension between § 5 and the
Reconstruction Amendments' commitment
to nondiscrimination.
Another 2006 amendment makes the § 5
burden even heavier. Section 5 prohibits
preclearance of laws that have the "purpose"
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of "denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 42 U.S.c. §
1973c(a). The Court had interpreted
"purpose" to be consistent with § 5' s effects
prong, so that the term justified denying
preclearance only to changes with a
"retrogressive" purpose, rather than changes
with either that or a discriminatory purpose.
See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528
u.s. 320, 341 (2000) ("Bossier 11"). The
2006 amendments reversed that decision,
specifying that "purpose" encompassed "any
discriminatory purpose." 42 U.S.c. §
1973c(c). This broadening of the § 5 criteria
may seem unexceptionable, but the Court
had previously found that assigning covered
jurisdictions the burden of proving the
absence of discriminatory purpose was
precisely the device that the Department had
employed in its pursuit of maximizing
majority-minority districts at any cost: "The
key to the Government's position, which is
plain from its objection letters if not from its
briefs to this cOUli . . . , is and always has
been that Georgia failed to proffer a
nondiscriminatory purpose for its refusal in
the first two submissions to take the steps
necessary to create [an additional] majorityminority district." Miller, 515 U.S. at 924.
By inseliing discriminatory purpose into § 5,
and
requmng
covered
jurisdictions
affirmatively to prove its absence, Congress
appears to have, at worst, restored "the
Justice Department's implicit command that
States
engage
in
presumptively
unconstitutional race-based districting," id.
at 927, and at best, "exacerbate[d] the
substantial federalism costs that the
preclearance procedure already exacts,"
Bossier 11, 528 U.S. at 336 ....
Whether Congress is free to impose § 5 on a
select set of jurisdictions also depends in
part, of course, on possible shortcomings in
the remedy that § 2 provides for the country

as a whole. That section creates a right to
sue any jurisdiction to stop voting practices
that "result[ ] in a denial or abridgement" of
the right to vote "on account of race or
color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Doubtless the
section is less drastic a remedy than § 5 (and
thus by some criteria less effective). But it is
easy to overstate the inadequacies of § 2,
such as cost and the consequences of delay.
Compare Maj. Op. at 872 . . . . So far as
Departmental resource constraints are
concerned, narrowing § 5's reach would, as
a matter of simple arithmetic, enable it to
increase § 2 enforcement with whatever
resources it stopped spending on § 5. . . .
Finally, as to the risk that discriminatory
practices may take hold before traditional
litigation has run its course, courts may as
always use the standard remedy of a
preliminary injunction to prevent irreparable
harm caused by adjudicative delay. See
Perry v. Perez, 132 S.Ct. 934,942 (2012).
Indeed, the ubiquitous availability of § 2 is
of course a reminder that § 5 was created for
the specific purpose of overcoming state and
local resistance to federal antidiscrimination
policy. When the Supreme Court first
upheld the act in 1966, it found that § 5 was
necessary because "case-by-case litigation,"
now governed by § 2, was "inadequate to
combat the widespread and persistent
discrimination in voting." Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 328. While § 2 was tailored to
redress actual instances of discrimination, §
5 was crafted to overcome a "century of
systematic resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment" and ongoing "obstructionist
tactics." Id.
But life in the covered jurisdictions has not
congealed in the 48 years since the first
triggering election (or the 40 years since the
most recent). "[C]urrent burdens ... must be
justified by current needs," Northwest
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A 1IS tin, 129 S.Ct. at 2512, and the burden
imposed by § 5 has only grown heavier in
those same years.

In order for § 4(b) to be congment and
proportional then, the disparity in current
evidence of discrimination between the
covered and uncovered jurisdictions must be
proportionate to the severe differential in
treatment imposed by § 5. Put another way,
a distinct gap must exist between the current
levels of discrimination in the covered and
uncovered jurisdictions in order to justify
subjecting the former group to § 5's harsh
remedy, even if one might find § 5
appropriate for a subset of that group ....
To recap, of the four metrics for which
comparative data exist, one (voter
registration and turnout) suggests that the
coverage formula completely lacks any
rational connection to current levels of voter
discrimination, another (black elected
officials), at best does nothing to combat
that suspicion, and, at worst, confirms it, and
two final metrics (federal observers and § 2
suits) indicate that the formula, though not
completely perverse, is a remarkably bad fit
with Congress's concerns. Given the drastic
remedy imposed on covered jurisdictions by
§ 5, as described above, I do not believe that
such equivocal evidence can sustain the
scheme.
The Supreme Court's initial review of the
formula in 1966 provides a model for
evaluating such an imperfect correlation. lt
assessed the evidence of discrimination
before it and divided the covered
jurisdictions into three categories: (l) a
group for which "federal courts have
repeatedly
found
substantial
voting
discrimination"; (2) another group "for
which there was more fragmentary evidence
of recent voting discrimination"; and (3) a
third set consisting of the "few remaining

States and political subdivisions covered by
the formula," for which there was little or no
such evidence of discrimination, but whose
use of voting tests and low voter turnout
warranted inclusion, "at least in the absence
of proof that they have been free of
substantial voting discrimination in recent
years." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329-30. In
that original review, the Supreme Court
placed three states (Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana) in category one, another
three (Georgia, South Carolina, and the
covered portions of North Carolina) in
category two, and finally two fully covered
states (Virginia and Alaska) plus a few
counties in Hawaii, Idaho, and Arizona, in
category three.
The evidence adduced above yields a far
worse fit than the data reviewed in
Katzenbach. Indeed, one would be hardpressed to put any of the covered
Katzenbach's
first
jurisdictions
into
category. Based on any of the comparative
data available to us, and particularly those
metrics relied on in Rome, it can hardly be
argued that there IS evidence of a
"substantial"
amount
of
voting
discrimination in any of the covered states,
and cel1ainly not at levels anywhere
comparable to those the Court faced in
Katzenbach. ...
All of this suggests that bailout may be only
the most modest palliative to § 5's burdens.
One scholar hypothesizes that bailout may
"exist [ ] more as a fictitious way out of
coverage than [as] an authentic way of
shoring up the constitutionality of the
coverage formula." Persily, S1lpra, at 213. In
fairness, the same scholar also entertains
various other explanations, including the
possibility that the eligible jurisdictions are
just the ones for whom § 5 poses only a very
light burden, see id. at 213-14, and
ultimately concludes that no one knows
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which theory "best explains the relative
absence of bailouts," id. at 214. Regardless
of the reason for the trivial number of
bailouts, irrational rules-here made so by
their encompassing six states and numerous
additional jurisdictions
not seriously
different from the uncovered states-cannot
be saved "by tacking on a waiver procedure"
such as bailout. ALLTEL Corp. v. FCC, 838
F.2d 551, 561 (D.C.Cir.1988).
Finally the government argues that because
the VRA is meant to protect the fundamental
right of racial minorities (i.e., a suspect
classification), a heightened level of
deference to Congress is III order.
22-23.
Purportedly
Appellees'
Br.
supporting this proposition is Chief Justice
Rehnquist's statement in Nevada Dep't of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003), that when a statute is designed to
protect a fundamental right or to prevent
discrimination based
on
a suspect
classification, "it [is] easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional
violations." ld. at 736. But the passage
simply makes the point that where a
classification is presumptively invalid (e.g.,
of
ltnlawfitl
race),
an
inference
discrimination follows almost automatically
from rules or acts that differentiate on the
presumptively forbidden basis, whereas for
classifications judged under the "rational
basis" test, such as disability or age,
"Congress must identify, not just the
existence of age- or disability-based state
decisions, but a widespread pattern of
irrational reliance on such criteria." ld. at
735. This special element of race or other
presumptively
unconstitutional
classifications has no bearing on review of
whether Congress's remedy "fits" the
proven pattern of discrimination. To hold
otherwise would ignore completely the
"vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal

balance" that the Court held paramount in
Boerne. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997) .....
The analysis above is my sole basis for
finding § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional
and thus for dissenting from the court's
opinion. I need not and do not reach the
constitutionality of § 5 itself. But before
concluding, I want to address a critical
aspect of § 5, and of some of the cases
interpreting earlier versions of that section ..

Section 5(b) makes unlawful any voting
practice or procedure with respect to voting
"that has the purpose of or will have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any
citizens of the United States on account of
race or color . . . to elect their preferred
candidates of choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b).
And of course similar phrasing has been
included in § 2 since 1982. See Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.L.
No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
The language (or a close equivalent) seems
to have originated in one of the Court's
earliest opinions on § 5, though only as an
offhand phrase in its explanation of how a
shift from district to at-large voting might
dilute minority impact: "Voters who are
members of a racial minority might well be
in the majority in one district, but a decided
minority in the county as a whole. This type
of change could therefore nullify their
ability to elect the candidate oftheir choice."
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
569 (1969). But the use of such language
became troubling in Georgia v. Ashcroft,
where the Court said that in the application
of § 5 "a court should not focus solely on the
comparative ability of a minority group to
elect a candidate of its choice." 539 U.S.
461, 480 (2003). The "solely" of course
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indicates approval of such a consideration as
one among several criteria for compliance
with § 5.
Implied from the statutory "their" is
necessarily a "they." In the context of a
statute speaking of impingements on
citizens' voting "on account of race or
color," and indeed in the universally
accepted understanding of the provision, the
"they" are necessarily members of minority
groups. But in what sense do minority
groups as such have a "preferred
candidate"? Individuals, of course, have
preferred candidates, but groups (unless
literally monolithic) can do so only in the
limited sense that a majority of the group
may have a preferred candidate. Thus, when
the provision is translated into operational
English, it calls for assuring "the ability of a
minority group's majority to elect their
preferred candidates."
This raises the question of what happened to
the minority group's own minority-those
who dissent from the preferences of the
minority's majority?
Of course in any polity that features
majority rule, some people are bound to be
outvoted on an issue or a candidate and thus
to "lose"-on that round of the ongoing
political game. Such losses are a necessary
function of any system requiring less than
unanimity (which would be hopelessly
impractical). And in an open society that
allows people freely to form associations,
and to design those associations, some
people obviously will be members of
associations whose representatives from
time to time express, in their name, opinions
they do not share. But that again is a
necessary function of having associations
free to adopt a structure that empowers their
leadership to speak with less than
unanimous backing.

But the implied "they" of § 5 is not a polity
in itself; nor is it an association freely
created by free citizens. Quite the reverse: It
is a group constructed artificially by the
mandate of Congress, entirely on the lines of
race or ethnicity.
On what authority has Congress constructed
such groups? Purportedly the
15th
Amendment to the Constitution. But that
says that the "right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude."
It is hard to imagine language that could
more clearly invoke universal individual
rights. It is "citizens" who are protected, and
they are protected from any denial of their
rights that might be based on the specified
group characteristics-race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. The
members of Congress who launched the
amendment, said Senator Willard Warner,
"profess to give to each individual an equal
share of political power." Congo Globe, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 861 (1869).

The 15th Amendment was a pivot point in
the struggle for universal human rights. The
roots of the struggle are deep and obscure.
Many trace the concept to the three great
monotheistic
religions,
Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. . . . Perhaps the
Enlightenment, though in tension with
organized religion, has a better title; it is
clearly the immediate root of the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen. But at all events the 15th
Amendment states a clear national
commitment to universal,
individual
political rights regardless of race or color.
Of course conventional political discourse
often uses such terms as "the black vote,"
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"the youth vote," "the senior vote," etc. But
those who use these terms . . . know
perfectly
well
that
they
are
oversimplifications, used to capture general
political tendencies, not a justification for
creating or assuming a political entity that
functions through a demographic group's
"majority." The Supreme COUli has
recognized that these generalizations are no
such justification. In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630
(1993),
it
confronted
racial
gerrymandering that took the form of
including in one district persons separated
by geographic and political boundaries and
who "may have little in common with one
another but the color of their skin." ld. at
647. Such a plan
bears an uncomfortable resemblance
to political apatiheid. It reinforces
the perception that members of the
same racial group-regardless of
their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which
they live-think alike, share the
same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have rejected such
perceptions
elsewhere
as
impermissible stereotypes.

ld.
. . . Section 5's mandate to advance "the
ability of any citizens of the United States

on account of race or color ... to elect their
preferred candidates of choice" is a partial
retreat to pre-Revolutionary times, an era
perhaps now so long past that its
implications are forgotten.
None of this is to suggest that the country
need for a minute countenance deliberate
voting rule manipulations aimed at reducing
the voting impact of any racial group,
whether in the form of restrictions on ballot
access or of boundary-drawing. And in
judicial proceedings to stamp out such
manipulations, it would of course be no
defense for the perpetrators to say that they
sought only to downweight a minority's
majority. But a congressional mandate to
assure the electoral impact of any minority's
majority seems to me more of a distortion
than an enforcement of the 15th
Amendment's ban on abridging the "right of
citizens of the United States to vote ... on
account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude." Preventing intentional
discrimination against a minority is radically
different from actively encouraging racial
gerrymandering in favor of the minority
(really, the majority of the minority), as § 5
does. Assuming there are places in which a
colorblind constitution does not suffice as a
"universal constitutional principle," Parents
v. Seattle School Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701,
788 (2007) (Kennedy, 1.), the voting booth
should not be one of them .
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"Section 5 Challenges Reach Court"
SCOTUSblog
July 202012
Lyle Denniston
Attorneys
for
challengers
to
the
constitutionality of the 1965 voting rights
law's key provision for federal regulation of
state and local election laws urged the
Supreme Court on Friday to settle the issue
in the next Term, starting October 1. One
new case arrived from the town of
Kinston in North Carolina and a second
came from Shelby County in Alabama. The
D.C. Circuit COUli has upheld the provision
at issue-Section 5-although the Supreme
Court itself three years ago raised significant
questions about its validity.
The Kinston case reached the Court this
morning. The Shelby County case was filed
in early afternoon. Not only has the time
come to examine the constitutional
questions the Court has raised, the Kinston
petition argued, but the Justice Department's
"overzealous manner" of enforcement of
Section 5 has put heavy new burdens on
state and local governments covered by that
provlSlon. The Shelby County petition
argued that the renewed law puts states into
"federal receivership," raising "fundamental
questions of state sovereignty," while
denying equality only to designated statespredominantly in the South. Shelby County
also assailed the Justice Department's
"needlessly aggressive exercise" of its veto
powers over state and local election laws.
Although the Kinston case was found to be
moot by the D.C. Circuit, the petition
challenged that conclusion and argued that
the Justices should grant review of both that
case and the one from Shelby County,
contending that the North Carolina case
pinpoints some of the key alterations in the

law made by Congress in 2006. When
Congress renewed Section 5 for an
additional 25 years, it imposed added
requirements on state and local governments
covered by that section, toughening the
standards for Washington approval of
election law changes. The challengers in the
Kinston litigation argued that those new
burdens prove even more convincingly that
Section 5 is now unconstitutionally broad as
it applies to the state and local governments
that remain the only ones targeted by
Shelby County's petition
Section 5.
contended that the new requirements
reinforce its argument that the entire 2006
renewal law is invalid.
Section 5 applies throughout nine states, and
to various county or city governments in
seven other states. The provision requires
state and local governments that had a prior
record of racial bias in voting to submit any
change in their election laws, in advance of
implementing such a change, either to the
Justice Department or to a special threejudge District Court in Washington. Only if
a change was given "pre-clearance" in
Washington could it be put into effect.
When the Supreme COUli was last faced
with a constitutional challenge to Section 5,
three years ago,
it bypassed the
constitutional question by expanding the
option of covered governments to "bail
out." In doing so, however, the Court raised
a variety of questions that suggested that the
coverage formula may be seriously out of
date, and thus may no longer be justified for
just those covered governments.
The negative comments by the Court then
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encouraged challengers to go after Section 5
anew. The Kinston and Shelby County
cases were among a series of new
challenges, along with lawsuits by states that
seek to enforce new photo ID requirements
for voters, but have been blocked by Justice
Department objections.
In its petition, Shelby County said that
Section 5 interferes directly in "the basic
operation of state and local government,"
which has the practical effect of barring "the
implementation of more than 100,000
electoral changes (more than 99 percent of
which will be noncontroversial) unless and
until they are pre-cleared by federal officials
in Washington, D.C. . . . A covered
jurisdiction must either go hat in hand to
DOJ officialdom to seek approval, or
embark on expensive litigation in a remote
judicial venue if it wishes to make any
change to its election system. It should be
no surprise, then, that states such as Florida,
Texas, and Alaska have joined Shelby
County
in
challenging
the
2006
reauthorization."

It summed up: "Only this Court, the ultimate
guardian and arbiter of the division of
powers that lies at the heart of our
constitutional system, can settle these
impOliant issues." Although the Court had
previously upheld Section 5, the county
petition argued, a new assessment is
necessary to judge "whether Section 5's
current needs justify its current burdens."
The constitutional issues, it added, "will
continue to fester until they are definitively
settled."
The Shelby County case is a challenge to the
2006 extension both for its unchanged
definition of the state and local governments
that are targeted, as well as to the new
requirements for pre-clearance that were
imposed on those governments. The

Kinston case is a challenge to the extension
with a special emphasis on the new preclearance standard. "This COUli should
grant review of both cases," the North
Carolina petition argued, in order "to
facilitate a timely and definitive resolution
of the exceptionally important question
whether the 2006 version of Section 5 is
facially valid."
Here, in paraphrase, is the way the Kinston
petition described the before and after
versions of the two changes that Congress
made in the pre-clearance standard:
Before: A state or local government could
be barred from making a change only if it
had the purpose or the effect of taking away
some of the voting power of minorities,
taking into account all circumstances.
Without that kind of proof, a government
entity need not make a change to make
minorities better off. After: The Justice
Department can now object to a change that
it believes discriminates against minorities
by failing to make them better off. (This
might be called the "Bossier 11 change"
because Congress made it in 2006 in
response to a Supreme Court decision in
2000, in the case of Reno v. Bossier Parish,
that Congress found had frustrated the goals
of Section 5.)
Before: Even if a change would take away
some of the voting power of minorities, the
change could be made anyway if the state or
local government had offset that loss by
doing something to improve minorities'
voting power, or if it really had no choice
but to make the change. After: A state or
local government must provide proof that
the change would not diminish the ability of
minorities "to elect their preferred
candidates of choice." This makes
minorities' election success the decisive
factor on whether they have lost
100

voting power. (That might be called the
"Ashcroft change" because Congress in
2006 was reacting to a 2003 Supreme Court
decision, Georgia v. Ashcroft, which the
lawmakers saw as narrowing the protection
for minorities under Section 5.)

D.C. Circuit Court, the Justice Depatiment
changed position, and said it was
withdrawing its objection to the switch to
non-partisan voting. That led the Circuit
Court to conclude that the Kinston case was
now moot.

In adopting those changes, the Kinston case
lawyers argued, Congress essentially wiped
out the Supreme Court rulings in Ashcroft
and Bossier 11. The effect of those
alterations of Section 5, that petition
asserted, is to put a new and unconstitutional
emphasis on using race, with the Justice
Department conditioning its pre-clearance
upon the use of race as a determining
factor. Shelby County, too, argued in its
petition that Congress' challenge to those
two rulings by the expanded pre-clearance
hurdle "compounded the problem" of
relying on an out-of-date coverage formula.

In the petition to the Supreme Court, the
Kinston challengers argued that the
Department's claim of "new evidence" was
only "a transparent pretext for DOJ to try to
moot this case to avoid defending on appeal
the 2006 amendments"-amendments that
had not been challenged in the separate
Shelby County case. No other challenger
has specifically protested in court against
those changes, the petition said. "This Court
cannot
properly
discharge [its]
vital
responsibility without fully considering the
nature and degree of the burden that the
substantive pre-clearance standard imposes."
With the issue of mootness in that case, the
petition went on, the Supreme Court should
still vote to grant multiple cases-the two
new ones-in order to address the full range
of issues now affecting Section 5. In any
event, they contended, the D.C. Circuit was
clearly wrong in allowing the Justice
Depatiment to come in at the last minute to
try to scuttle the broader challenge to the
2006 extension of Section 5.

The Kinston case grew out of a 2008 voterapproved change in the way Kinston chose
its local government officials, from one
based on party identification of candidates to
a non-paliisan approach. Because Kinston
is located in a county covered by Section 5,
it needed Washington clearance to
implement the change.
The Justice
Department objected, contending that
switching to non-partisan voting would
diminish blacks' voting strength because it
would not allow their preferred candidates
who had run as Democrats to count on the
voters of whites who also were Democrats.
Section 5 was then challenged in federal
court by John Nix, who had wanted to run as
a non-patiy candidate for city council, and
by a local organization that favored nonpartisan elections. The lawsuit challenged
the old and unchanged coverage formula,
and the new changes in the pre-clearance
standard. A federal District judge rejected
both challenges. But, during briefing in the

In its challenge to Section 5 on the merits,
the Kinston petition argued that the Supreme
Court had sent a clear signal to Congress
that it ought to consider modifying the
coverage formula for Section 5, based as it
is on out-of-date considerations. But, it
noted, Congress has done nothing to respond
to the Court's constitutional concerns. "In
the three years since," the petition said,
"Congress has refused to take any action,
declining to update (or even revisit) the preclearance regime to ensure that its 'disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related
to the problem that it targets,'" quoting from
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the Court's 2009 opinion
Northwest Austin v. Holder.

In

the case of

Shelby County's petition echoed that
complaint. "In the more than three years
after Northwest Austin, Congress held not
one hearing, proposed not one bill, and
amended not one law in response to the
concern" that Section 5 and other coverage
formulas in the 1965 law are not justified by
the evidence before Congress in 2006.
While praising Congress for enacting the
original bill in 1965, when it crafted "a
coverage formula that was sound in theory
and in practice" at that time, the same
cannot be said of the 2006 extension,
according to the county's filing.
Besides challenging Section 5 itself, the

Shelby County petition also contests the
constitutionality of the 1965 law's Section
4(b), which is the provision that lays out the
formula that brought a state or a local
government under Section 5's pre-clearance
requirement.
Shelby County, while it is covered by the
law, did not file its lawsuit after having a
voting change vetoed by the Justice
Department or by a federal court. Instead, it
filed a lawsuit seeking to strike down the
2006 renewal as written, so that, if this
challenge succeeded, the law could not be
validly applied in any factual situation.
The Kinston case, Nix v. Holder, has now
been docketed as 12-81. The Shelby County
case has now been docketed as 12-96.
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"Insight: From Alabama, an Epic Challenge to Voting Rights"
Re1lters

June 4, 2012
Joan Biskupic
Four years ago, in this small city of gentle
hills, tall oaks and nine stoplights, an
invisible line was drawn a few miles north
of the center of town. It stretched up beyond
Highway 22 and looped west across
Interstate 65, sweeping in recent housing
developments, the brown-brick Concord
Baptist Church and a new Wal-Mart. The
narrow five-square-mile rectangle enlarged
Voting District 2.
It also radically changed the district's racial
mix. The expansion brought in hundreds of
white voters, cutting the proportion of black
registered voters to one-third from more
than two-thirds. The city, which said it had
to redraw its district map to account for a
population increase and land annexations,
contended the new boundaries would not
discriminate against blacks.

The U.S. Department of Justice was not
persuaded. In a tersely worded, three-page
letter emailed to the Calera city attorney on
August 25, 2008, it voided the new map.

Now Shelby County v. Hohler is poised to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court. Last month a
federal appeals court in Washington rejected
the claim and upheld the Section 5
preclearance requirement, saying Congress
had enough evidence of recent racial
discrimination to justify reauthorizing the
law when it did so in 2006. Racial
discrimination in voting is "one of the
gravest evils that Congress can seek to
redress," U.S. Appeals Court Judge David
Tatel declared for the court majority.
But Chief Justice John Roberts of the U.S.
Supreme Court appears ready to re-examine
the preclearance rule, which covers all or
part of 16 states, most of them in the South.
In deciding another case three years ago, he
wrote: "Things have changed in the South."
He suggested that the provision may no
longer be needed.
As events in Calera show, however, whether
the law is unnecessary is far from obvious.
DARK CHAPTERS

The letter set off a chain of events resulting
in what could be the most important
challenge in years to the 1965 Voting Rights
Act. A lawsuit later brought by Shelby
County, where Calera is situated, seeks to
strike down the law's requirement that
Alabama and other states with a history of
discrimination obtain federal approval for
any changes to districting and ballot rules.
They argue that this federal "preclearance"
obligation, mandated by Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, is an outdated, unfair and
unconstitutional relic of an Old South that
no longer exists.

Like many places in the Old South, Calera
and surrounding Shelby County witnessed
dark chapters of racial violence after the
Civil War. Lynching continued into the
early 1900s. In Calera, older residents still
recall poll taxes and Dairy Queen drinking
fountains marked "whites" and "colored."
As recently as 1999 a large Confederate flag
hung in the entrance to the Shelby County
Historical Society Museum, according to
Bobby Joe Seales, society president, who
said he removed the flag that year when he
took office.
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But Calera has changed. Thanks partly to
spillover from bedroom communities in
Birmingham to the north, its population has
more than doubled in the last decade to
11,700. A city once known for its rail hub
and lime manufacturing now boasts a
growing service and retailing sector. Blacks
continue to make up slightly more than a
fifth of the population, but neighborhoods
are much less clearly defined by race.
Recently, as he drove a visitor around new
subdivisions off Highway 31, Calera's 41year-old mayor, Jon Graham, pointed out
houses owned by blacks alongside others
owned by whites. "We see no difference in
skin color in Calera," he said.
The mayor, who has close-cropped brown
hair and an open boyish face, said the city
was not trying to reduce black voter strength
when it redrew District 2 in 2008. To the
contrary, he said, thanks to increased
integration, it would have been hard to draw
a majority-black district without creating
wildly gerrymandered lines.
"Integration has been effective," said
Graham, who in addition to his civic duties
operates an auto-parts shop. "It's hard to
take this city and dissect it and come up with
one true, heavily populated minority
district. "

A VOIDED ELECTION
In rejecting Calera's new districts, the
Justice DepaIiment claimed that the city had
not adequately tracked black popUlation nor
properly apprised the depaIiment of some
177 land annexations. Its letter to the city
stated that basic information from the city
about its voting-age population and racial
makeup was "unreliable."
Lawyers for the city disagreed and thought

they could persuade federal authorities to
accept the new map. Plus, they had a city
council election scheduled for the next day,
which they believed could not be postponed
under state law. So on August 26, 2008,
Calera went to the polls.
The outcome only proved the problem.
Ernest Montgomery, the District 2
representative and the only African
American on the five-member city council,
was voted out.
The Justice DepaIiment swiftly blocked
certification of the election results, and
Montgomery kept his seat pending a new
vote.
In an interview at the New Mount Moriah
Missionary Baptist Church that he has
attended since childhood, Montgomery, a
55-year-old machinist with a reserved
manner, said he believed some whites voted
for his opponent simply based on the color
of his skin. He did not feel the redrawn
district had been "intentionally stacked."
But, he added, "I know others in the
community thought so."
His pastor, Harry Jones, 48, is one of them.
"The only African American that we had in
there got the short end of the stick," he said.
After a year of negotiation, Calera decided
to get rid of its five-district map entirely and
created six "at large" council seats that
would be filled by members elected by the
city as a whole. In a new election in 2009,
Montgomery won one of them.

TROLLING FOR A TEST CASE
Things might have ended there. But in 2008
a Washington, D.C.-based conservative
advocate named Edward Blum was trolling
the Justice Department website for potential
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voting-rights test cases. The Calera letter,
which was posted on the site, caught his eye.

from Section 5 based on its clean votingrights record.

Blum picked up the phone and called Frank
"Butch" Ellis, the lawyer for Calera and for
Shelby County. Ellis, who had been working
as a municipal lawyer in central Alabama
for 40 years, was as frustrated as Blum was
with the federal preclearance requirement.

Blum was in the courtroom when the
decision was announced, and his hemi sank.
"I was waiting for a few key words, and I
didn't get them," he said. Yet Roberts's
opinion for the court offered him some hope
when it suggested the South had changed.

Blum told Ellis he already was busy with a
Section 5 challenge involving an Austin,
Texas, water district that was working its
way up through the courts but said he was
always on the lookout for other
opportunities. The men agreed to stay in
touch. "We felt that the Justice Department
was stuck in a 1960s time warp," Blum said.

BACK TO SHELBY COUNTY

A former investment banker, Blum had been
challenging race-based policies since 1992,
when he lost an election for Congress in a
racially drawn Houston district. His case
against Texas officials over the line-drawing
went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and in 1996 the court ruled the district
unconstitutional. Since then Blum, thin,
angular, with a formal presence, has sought
out government programs that he believes
wrongly use racial criteria. Now 60 and a
visiting fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute, Blum raises money through his
Project
on
Fair
foundation,
the
Representation, to hire lawyers to challenge
racial redistricting, affirmative action and
other such policies.
In the Austin water district case, Blum
thought he had found the perfect plaintiff for
an attack on Section 5. But when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided the case in 2009, it
punted on the big constitutional issuewhether Congress had enough evidence of
discrimination to justify reauthorizing the
law. It said the water district was exempt

In frustration, Blum reached out again to
Butch Ellis in Shelby County. The two men
commiserated over their disappointment.
Blum said he thought Shelby County could
bring a stronger case against Section 5 than
the Austin water district. After all, Calera's
conflict with the Justice Depmiment meant
the county did not have a clean voting-rights
record so its argument could not get tossed
out on the same technicality.
Ellis, a 72-year-old county lawyer who grew
up on a nearby dairy farm, said he supports
the overall principles of the Voting Rights
Act and its provision allowing people to sue
for intentional discrimination. But the
Section 5 preclearance obligation, he said,
unnecessarily covers the smallest electoral
change, even moving a polling place across
the street.
"It had its time. Its time has come. And it's
gone," he said. Ellis said racial tensions had
faded in Shelby County, one of the more
prosperous and highly educated in Alabama.
He boasted that any visitor to the county
would observe black and white children
playing together.

Realizing that a big constitutional challenge
would need major legal firepower, Blum
connected
Ellis
to
the
prominent
Washington, D.C., lawyer Bert Rein, whose
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firm, Wiley Rein, has handled cases for
Blum since the mid-1990s. Rein is
representing the plaintiff in another highprofile lawsuit that Blum coordinated, a
challenge to affirmative action at the
University of Texas, to be heard by the
Supreme Court this autumn.

council member Montgomery, pastor Jones,
and other African Americans at the New
Mount Moriah church. They agreed to
intervene in the case on the side of the
Justice Department, arguing that Section 5 is
still vital to minority voting rights. The
NAACP defense fund would represent them.

SHELBY COUNTY TAKES AIM

Last year the district court ruled against
Shelby County. Judge John Bates, a George
W. Bush appointee, said Congress had
extensive evidence of recent voting abuses
in Alabama, such as "reports of voting
officials closing doors on African-American
voters." He noted that Calera's redistricting
plan would have eliminated the sole
majority-black district. Last month, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld
the district court ruling.

In April 2010, Shelby County filed a lawsuit
against the Justice Department at the U.S.
District Court in Washington, taking direct
aim at Section 5. The suit argued that
Congress when reauthorizing the law in
2006 did not have enough evidence to
justify its continuation or the places covered.
When NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer
Ryan Haygood in New York saw the lawsuit
he immediately realized its importance. But
he also thought Blum had picked a
problematic plaintiff. The Calera, Shelby
County, election in which the only black
candidate lost, he said, proved how the law
protects racial minorities. "They absolutely
chose the wrong venue for the proposition
that Section 5 has outlived its usefulness,"
Haygood said, adding flatly, "See Ernest
Montgomery. "

Rein, representing Shelby County, said he
planned to file an appeal this summer.
Montgomery, who attended segregated
schools until junior high, said his elderly
parents were nervous about his becoming
part of the national case. They remembered
how, in their day, blacks who took a stand
were threatened, harassed or worse. "I know
we've gone a long way," said Montgomery,
"but we have a long way to go."

Haygood flew out to Calera and met with
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"Appeals Court Upholds Key
Voting-Rights Law"
Wall Street J01lrnal

May 18,2012
Evan Perez
An appeals court upheld a federal votingrights law that requires some local
governments to seek Washington's approval
before changing election procedures,
rejecting a challenge by an Alabama county.
In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
Friday that Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 remains constitutional. The
judges said Congress acted properly in 2006
to reauthorize the law in order to protect
minority voters.
Section 5 requires parts or all of 16 states
with a history of racial bias in elections to
seek federal approval, or preclearance,
before altering voting procedures.
The decision came in a challenge by Shelby
County, Ala., and was viewed as an
important test of Section 5, which a 2009
Supreme Court ruling suggested may no
longer be justified given changes in voting
patterns. The appellate court cited that
decision, which upheld the Voting Rights
Act but also opened the door to challenges
to Section 5.
The appellate panel said it weighed concerns
about whether Section 5 remains "congruent
and proportional" to the problem it seeks to
prevent. It determined that "Congress drew
reasonable conclusions from the extensive
evidence it gathered" and acted III
accordance with the Constitution in
"ensuring that the right to vote ... -surely
among the most important guarantees of
political liberty in the Constitution-is not
abridged on account of race." Congress

deserved deference in making the judgment,
the court said.
The county indicated it plans to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Shelby County, which includes suburbs of
Birmingham, argued Section 5 places an
undue burden on local governments. The
provision could only be justified if there
were current evidence the jurisdiction was
carrying out the "unremitting and ingenious
defiance" that existed in 1965 when the
original law was passed, the county said.
The majority opinion by Judge David Tatel,
a Clinton appointee, was joined by Judge
Thomas Griffith, a George W. Bush
appointee.
Dissenting Judge Stephen Williams, a
Reagan appointee, suggested Section 5
could be used to encourage "racial
gerrymandering in favor of the minority."
He said "a congressional mandate to assure
the electoral impact of any minority'S
majority seems to me more of a distortion
than an enforcement of the 15th
Amendment's ban on abridging" the right to
vote because of race.
County attorney Frank "Butch" Ellis said
Shelby County suppOlied the Voting Rights
Act and wanted only to be released from the
burden of preclearance in recognition of
how much the county has changed in nearly
50 years.
"I'm pleased with the strong dissent," Mr.
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Ellis said in an interview, adding that the
county believes now is the time to seek a
Supreme COUlt decision on Section 5's
constitutionality.

A U.S. Justice Depmtment statement said it
welcomed the ruling and that Section 5
"continues to serve as a critical tool in both
blocking and deterring discriminatory voting
practices. "
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"Do We Still Need the Voting Rights Act?"
The New Yorker
May 22,2012
Jeffrey Toobin
The chances to remake American law-and
maybe American society-are stacking up
for the Supreme Court. Next month, the
Justices will render their verdicts on the
Affordable Care Act and on the Arizona
immigration law. The fate of affirmative
action in university admissions will likely be
determined by the Roberts Court in its next
term, and now another blockbuster appears
headed for the Justices as well. The future of
the Voting Rights Act-probably the Great
Society's greatest landmark-will almost
certainly be in the Court's hands next year.
The hemi of the Voting Rights Act is its
famous Section 5, which essentially put the
South on perpetual probation. In rough
terms, the law requires the states of the old
Confederacy (as well as a few smaller areas
outside the South) to submit any changes in
their electoral law to the Justice Depmiment
for what's known as "pre-clearance"-to
make sure that the changes don't infringe on
minority voting rights. Before Section 5,
states and municipalities could simply
change their rules-about everything from
the location of polling places to the borders
of district lines-and dare civil-rights
activists to sue to stop them. It was a
maddening, and very high-stakes, game of
whack-a-mole. As a result of Section 5,
though, the Justice Department monitored
these moves and made sure there would be
no backsliding on voting rights.
In 1965, Congress authorized Section 5 for
five years. In subsequent years, Congress
has extended the provision several times,
and in 2006, it was reauthorized for another
twenty-five years. In 2009, the Supreme

Court ducked a challenge to the law on
procedural grounds, but now the issue
cannot be evaded any longer. Last week, a
three-judge panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit voted twoto-one to uphold the Voting Rights Act and
reject a challenge to Section 5 by Shelby
County, in Alabama. Next stop for the case:
the Supreme Court.
The questions at the heart of the case are
both simple and profound. How much has
American society, and especially the South,
changed with regard to race relations since
1965? Is Section 5 still a necessary check on
the white majority-or is the law a
patronizing relic of a vanished age? Judge
David Tatel, writing for the majority, said
Congress still had the right to insist that the
Justice Department continue to monitor
voting rights in the South.
Tatel's opinion acknowledged the obvious:
that a great deal had changed for the better
in the South, and elsewhere, since 1965. He
said futiher that the evidence of continuing
"by no
means
discrimination
was
unambiguous." Still, while the days of Bull
Connor are long gone, Tatel said that
Congress still had reason to keep Section 5
in place when it held the reauthorization
vote in 2006. "Vote dilution" remained a big
problem for black citizens; that is, white
legislators were still "'packing' minorities
into a single district, spreading minority
voters thinly among several districts,
annexing predominately white suburbs, and
so on." Celiain facts, too, were unavoidable,
notably that "not one African American had
yet been elected to statewide office in
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Mississippi, Louisiana, or South Carolina."
In short, Tatel concluded that "serious and
widespread
intentional
discrimination
persisted in covered jurisdictions and that
case-by-case enforcement alone ... would
leave minority citizens with an inadequate
remedy." Without Section 5, Tatel
concluded, the rights of minority voters
would be in jeopardy.
The dissent of Judge Stephen Williams came
down to a simple idea: times have changed.
Even the Justice Department, he pointed out,
scarcely ever objects to the changes
submitted for preclearance. (There were
only five objections for every ten thousand
submissions between 1998 and 2002.)
Williams acknowledges that racial bias still
exists, but he noted, with some justification,
that it's now as evident in uncovered
jurisdictions (i.e., the rest of the country) as
in the South. But that melancholy
observation led Williams to conclude that
the Voting Rights Act should not apply
anywhere anymore.
It's a hard case. "Things have changed in the
South," Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
wrote in the 2009 opinion that put off the
Voting Rights Act's day of reckoning.
"Voter turnout and registration rates now
approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory
evaSIOns of federal decrees are rare. And
minority candidates
hold office at

unprecedented levels." All true, to be sure.
One might also add that the President of the
United States, who won office with the
Electoral College votes of Virginia and
North Carolina, is African-American. In this
way, the United States of 2012 is an almost
unrecognizable version of the country in
1965.
But as those changes illustrate, nothing
about the nation is static, and it's not easy to
say which way the country is moving on
racial matters. By overwhelming majorities,
both Houses of Congress thought it was
worthwhile to maintain the federal
monitoring that has made such changes took
place. It's a more complicated country these
days, but it's not a fully healed one, either.
So far, the Roberts Court has been eager to
portray the nation as beyond the need for
racial remedies-especially with regard to
public schools. In light of that record, the
odds are that the Court will reach the same
kind of conclusion with regard to the Voting
Rights Act and declare Section 5
unconstitutional. At that point, the whitecontrolled legislatures of the former
Confederacy will be largely on their own in
protecting minority voting rights. For better
or worse, our problems are solved when the
Court says they are-and these Justices
appear determined indeed to close the door
to an era that may not be completely over.
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United States v. Danieiczyk
No. 11-4667
Ruling Below: United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).

William Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi were indicted under the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 (FECA), which bans direct corporate contributions to political campaigns. The district
court granted Danielczyk and Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph lOeb) of their
indictment that asserted they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's
2008 presidential campaign. The district court held that in light of Citizens United v. FEC, FECA
section 441 b(a) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants and dismissed count four,
paragraph 1O(b). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Citizens United does not render FECA's ban on
direct corporate contributions unconstitutional as applied to the defendants.
Question Presented: Whether the holding in Citizens United v. FEC also held unconstitutional
the prohibition of direct corporate contributions to political campaigns under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM P. DANIELCZYK, JR., a/k/a Bill Danielczyk; Eugene R. Biagi, a/k/a Gene
Biagi, Defendants-Appellees

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided June 28, 2012

[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
The Government appeals the district court's
grant of William P. Danielczyk, Jr. and
Eugene R. Biagi's (the "Appellees") motion
to dismiss count four and paragraph 1O(b) of
the indictment, alleging that they conspired
to and did facilitate direct contributions to
2008
presidential
Hillary
Clinton's
campaign in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441 b(a)
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 ("FECA"), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The

district cOUli reasoned that in light of
Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, U.S. - - , 130 S.Ct. 876
(2010), § 441 b( a) is unconstitutional as
applied to the Appellees. We disagree for
the following reasons and thus reverse the
district court's grant of the motion to
dismiss count four and paragraph 1O(b) of
the indictment.

I.
Danielczyk and Biagi were officers of Galen
Capital Group, LLC, and Galen Capital
Corporation (together, "Galen"). At the time
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of the charged conduct, Danielczyk was
Galen's chairman, while Biagi was Galen's
secretary. In March of 2007, Danielczyk cohosted a fundraiser for Clinton's campaign
and had individuals, including Biagi, give
donations to the campaign with the promise
that they would be reimbursed by Galen.
Danielczyk and Biagi concealed Galen's
reimbursements by writing "consulting fees"
on the reimbursement checks' memorandum
lines, by issuing the checks for amounts
larger than the actual contributions, and by
creating false back-dated letters to the
individual donors that characterized the
reimbursement payments as "consulting
fees." In total, Danielczyk and Biagi
reimbursed the donors for $156,400 in
contributions made to Clinton's 2008
campaign, and the campaign in turn reported
the contributions to the Federal Election
Commission.
Danielczyk and Biagi were indicted on
seven counts for this contribution scheme.
Count four and paragraph 1O(b) respectively
charged the Appellees with knowingly and
willfully causing contributions of corporate
money to a candidate for federal office,
aggregating $25,000 or more, in violation of
§ 44Ib(a) and 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(I)(A)(i),
and conspiring to do so. On April 6, 2011,
Danielczyk and Biagi moved to dismiss
count four, contending that § 441 b(a) is
unconstitutional as applied to them in light
of Citizens United.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Citizens United, § 441 b(a) made it unlawful
for corporations to make both direct
contributions to political candidates and
independent expenditures on speech that
expressly advocates for or against the
election or defeat of a candidate. However,
the FECA permitted individuals to make
independent
expenditures
and
direct
contributions within limits. See, e.g., 2

U.S.c. § 441a(a). The act also allowed
corporations wanting to make either type of
expenditure to form political action
committees ("P ACs"), which were entities
separate from the corporations subject to
regulatory requirements. See 2 U.S.c. §
441 b(b )(2)(C); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1 (a)(2)(iii),
(b), and lI4.5(d). Citizens United struck
down § 441 b(a)'s prohibition against
corporate
independent
expenditures,
reasoning in part that the ban was not
supported by the interest in preventing quid
pro quo corruption, 130 S.Ct. at 908-09, and
further that "the First Amendment does not
allow political speech restrictions based on a
speaker's corporate identity," id. at 903.
Citizens United left untouched § 441b(a)'s
ban on direct corporate contributions.
Relying on Citizens United, the district court
held that § 441 b(a),s ban on direct corporate
contributions as applied to Galen is
unconstitutional because it impermissibly
treats corporations and individuals unequally
for purposes of political speech. The district
court rejected the Government's contention
of
that
the
differential
treatment
corporations in the context of direct
contributions
fulfills
legitimate
governmental interests, such as the
prevention of quid pro quo conuption. It
concluded that the interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption could be fulfilled by
requiring corporations to comply with the
act's contribution limits for individual
donors.
Five days after it granted the motion to
dismiss, the district court sua sponte ordered
the parties to file briefs on whether, in light
of Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
and Federal Election Commission v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), the court
should reconsider its decision. In Beaumont,
the Supreme Court rejected an as-applied
challenge to § 441 b( a)' s ban on direct
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corporate contributions. 539 U.S. at 163.
The Government argued that Beaumont
directly controlled the case and must be
applied even if Citizens United may have
eroded Beaumont's reasoning. This is
because the Agostini principle requires
lower cOUlis to apply Supreme Court
precedent that directly controls the case
before it despite subsequent Supreme Court
case law that may have affected the
precedent by implication. 521 U.S. at 237.
After considering the briefs, the district
court denied reconsideration of its dismissal.
It reasoned that Beaumont did not directly
control the case because it addressed an asapplied challenge of § 441b(a)'s ban on
direct corporate contributions against a
nonprofit corporation and not, as in this
case, a for-profit corporation like Galen. The
district court further affirmed the rationale in
its earlier ruling that § 441 b(a) violated
Citizens United by treating corporations and
individuals unequally. Accordingly, it
concluded that count four and paragraph
1O(b) remained dismissed. The Government
timely appealed.

some other line of decisions, [courts] should
follow the line of cases which directly
controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the
prerogative of overturning its own
decisions." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
237 (1997)). Thus, lower courts should not
conclude that the Supreme Court's "more
recent cases have, by implication, overruled
[its] earlier precedent." Id.
In Beaumont, the Supreme Court addressed
a First Amendment challenge to § 441b(a)
as it applied to nonprofit advocacy
corporations. Federal Election Commission
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 156 (2003). In
that case, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc.
("NCRL"),
a
nonprofit
corporation
organized to provide counseling to pregnant
women and to promote alternatives to
abortion, brought an as-applied challenge to
§ 441 b( a)' s ban on direct corporate
contributions and independent expenditures.
Id. at 150. A panel of this Circuit found the
ban on both independent expenditures and
direct contributions unconstitutional as
applied to NCRL. Beaumont v. FEC, 278
F.3d 261, 279 (4th Cir.2002), rev'd by
Bea1lmont, 539 U.S. 146.

II.

For the following reasons, we hold that §
441 b(a) is not unconstitutional as applied to
the Appellees. Bea1lmont clearly supports
the constitutionality of § 441 b(a) and
Citizens United, a case that addresses
corporate independent expenditures, does
not undermine Beaumont's reasoning on this
point. The district court erred when it
granted the Appellees' motion to dismiss.

A.
The Agostini principle provides that in
circumstances
when
Supreme
Court
precedent has "direct application in a case,
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in

With respect to direct contributions, the
panel reasoned that the ban was unjustified
in light of Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
("MCFL"), 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986), a
decision in which the Supreme COUli held
that § 441 b(a)' s ban on independent
expenditures was unconstitutional as applied
to a nonprofit corporation that, in many
respects, was similar to NCRL. Id. at 275.
As a result, the panel extended MCFL's
holding that solely addressed § 441b(a)'s
ban on independent expenditures to the
context of the provision's ban on direct
contributions, concluding that "[i]n neither
case is there the threat of quid pro quo,
monetary influence, or distOliion corruption
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that the prohibitions seek to prevent." ld.
After this Circuit denied a rehearing en
banc, the Federal Election Commission
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari
only on the issue of whether the ban on
direct contributions was constitutional.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 151.

has supported bans on direct contributions
against for-profit corporations. ld. at 157.
Overall, Bea1lmont makes clear that §
441 b( a)' s
ban
on
direct
corporate
contributions is constitutional as applied to
all corporations.

B.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed this Circuit's opinion. 539 U.S. at
163. In doing so, the Supreme Court
thoroughly explained its longstanding
jurisprudence
upholding
Congress's
"original, core prohibition on direct
corporate contributions" and warned that
this jurisprudence "would discourage any
broadside attack on corporate campaign
of
corporate
finance
regulation
contributions." ld. at 153, 156. It remarked
that it had previously held that § 441 b(a) had
"broad applicability" to both corporations
and labor unions regardless of their financial
disposition and rejected NCRL's various
arguments to limit this applicability,
including that the ban did not adequately
consider the variations between corporations
with respect to affluence and diversity of
corporate form.ld. at 157. It then recognized
four government interests that supported the
ban on direct corporate contributions: anticorruption,
anti-distortion,
dissentingshareholder,
and
anti-circumvention
(preventing the evasion of valid individual
contribution limits). ld. at 153-55. The
Supreme Court rejected NCRL's position
that these government interests are
implicated only by for-profit corporations,
reasoning that non-profits, just like forprofits,
benefit
from
state-created
advantages, can amass political war chests,
and are susceptible to corruption and misuse
as conduits for circumventing individual
contribution limits. ld. at 160. Thus, in
addressing § 441 b(a),s applicability to a
nonprofit advocacy corporation, the Court
based its conclusion on a century of law that

The Appellees contend that Bea1lmont does
not govern our inquiry here because its
holding
was
limited
to
nonprofit
corporations. For the reasons expressed
above, we do not read Bea1lmont so
narrowly. Bea1lmont stands for the
proposition that a nonprofit corporation does
not differ from a for-profit corporation for
purposes of § 441 b(a) because all
corporations
implicate
the
asserted
government interests, and § 441 b(a) is
closely drawn to further those interests.
However, even if we did agree with the
Appellees, we cannot ignore Bea1lmont's
extensive
discussion
of
Congress's
legitimate interests in regulating direct
contributions made by all corporations. As
the Supreme COUli has stated, "When an
opinion issues for the Court, it is not only
the result but also those portions of the
opinion necessary to that result by which we
are bound." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 67 (1996). Nor should we forget
that NCRL recognized the uphill battle it
faced in challenging the general ban on
direct contributions and thus did not request
complete upheaval of the law, but only that
non-profits, like it, be exempt. Bea1lmont,
539 U.S. at 156. Thus, at the very least,
Bea1lmont's discussion of the ban as it
applies to all corporations informs our
inquiry here.

c.
The Appellees would have this Court hold
that Citizens United repudiated Bea1lmont's
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entire reasoning; this we cannot do. Citizens
United held that in the context of
independent expenditures, the Government
could not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker's corporate identity. In
reaching its decision, the Court did not
discuss Bea1lmont and explicitly declined to
address the constitutionality of the ban on
direct contributions. Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, U.S. - ,
130 S.Ct. 876, 909 (2010). Nor did the
opinion indicate that its "corporations-areequal-to-people" logic necessarily applies in
the context of direct contributions. ld. at
903. Leaping to this conclusion ignores the
well-established principle that independent
expenditures and direct contributions are
subject to different standards of scrutiny and
supported by different government interests.
See Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 735 (4th
Cir.20 11 ) (concluding that Citizens United
did not overrule "B1Ickley [v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659
(1976)], Nixon v. [Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d
886 (2000)], Bea1lmont, or other cases
applying 'closely drawn' scrutiny to
contribution restrictions").
Independent expenditure limitations are
"substantial rather than merely theoretical
restraints on the quantity and diversity of
political speech." B1Ickley, 424 U.S. at 19.
"By contrast . . . a limitation upon the
amount that anyone person or group may
contribute to a candidate or political
committee entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication," id. at 20-21, and thus
"lie[s] closer to the edges than to the core of
political expression," Beaumont, 539 U.S. at
161. The "markedly greater burden" on
basic freedoms imposed by independent
expenditure limitations requires that these
"exact
scrutiny
limitations
survive
applicable to limitations on core First

Amendment rights of political expression."
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
Direct contribution limitations, on the other
hand, require the "lesser demand of being
closely drawn to match a sufficiently
important interest." Bea1lmont, 539 U.S. at
162 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
reason for this difference in scrutiny is clear:
independent expenditures, by definition, are
direct means by which political speech
enters into the marketplace, see Citizens
130 S.Ct. at 898; direct
United,
contributions, conversely, do not necessarily
fund political speech but must be
transformed into speech by an individual
other than the contributor, see Bea1lmont,
539 U.S at 161-62. To minimize the
constitutional
differences
between
regulations
that
govern
independent
expenditures and regulations that ban direct
contributions by applying Citizens United to
this case would repeat the same error this
Circuit committed in Beaumont. See
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 151 (rejecting this
Circuit's conclusion that "the rationale
utilized by the Court in [MCFL ] to declare
prohibitions on independent expenditures
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL-type
corporations is equally applicable in the
context of direct contributions.").
As recently recognized by the Second and
Ninth Circuits, Citizens United preserved
two of the four important government
interests recognized in Beaumont: anticorruption
and
anti-circumvention.
Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 195 n. 21
(2d Cir.20 11 ) (declining to hold that
Beallmont was ovenuled by Citizens United,
and determining that Citizens United
preserved the anti-corruption and anticircumvention interests); Thalheimer v. City
of San Diego, 645 F .3d 1109, 1125 (9th
Cir.20 11) (holding that Citizens United did
not disapprove of the anti-circumvention
115

interest); Green Party of Conn. v. Gmfzeld,
616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir.201O)
("Bea1lmont . .. remain[s] good law. Indeed,
in the recent Citizens United case, the Court
. . . explicitly declined to reconsider its
precedent involving campaign contrib1ltions
by corporations to candidates for elected
office.").
Prevention of actual and perceived
corruption and the threat of circumvention
are firmly established government interests
that support regulations on campaign
financing. See Bea1lmont, 539 U.S. at 154;
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390 ("Even without the
authority of BlIckley, there would be no
serious question about the legitimacy of the
interest[ ] [of preventing corruption and the
appearance of it] [ ], which, after all,
underlie[s]
bribery
and
anti-gratuity
statutes."); B1lckley, 424 U.S. at 27 ("Of
almost equal concern as the danger of actual
quid pro quo arrangements [through
contributions] is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from
public awareness of the opportunities for
abuse."). While clarifying that the anticorruption interest is limited to actual quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance of it,
as opposed to the appearance of influence or
access, Citizens United did not deny that
anti-corruption was a sufficiently important
governmental interest, which is all that is
required for closely drawn scrutiny. 130
S.Ct. at 909-10. Instead, it held that the
interest did not justify a ban on corporate
independent expenditures under strictscrutiny review.ld. at 911.

With respect to the antI-circumvention
interest, the Bea1lmont court explained that
without
limitations
on
corporate
contributions, individuals "could exceed the
bounds imposed on their own contributions
by
diverting
money
through
the
corporation." 539 U.S. at 155. Thus the
interest in preventing such evasion is
grounded in the "experience" of "candidates,
donors, and parties [that] test the limits of
the current law, and it shows beyond serious
doubt how contribution limits would be
eroded if inducement to circumvent them
were enhanced." ld. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Citizens
United did not undercut Beallmont's
endorsement of this interest. Indeed, the
majority opinion did not even discuss this
interest when it shuck down the independent
expenditure ban, and thus prior Supreme
Court precedent affirming this interest
remains the law this Court must follow. See
e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456
(2001); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S.
182(1981).

III.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
district comi erred in granting the
Appellees' motion to dismiss count four and
paragraph 1O(b) of the indictment. The
district court's grant of the motion to
dismiss with respect to count four and
paragraph 1O(b) is reversed.
REVERSED
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"Virginia Appeals Court Affirms Campaign Finance Law"
Associated Press
June 29, 2012
Larry O'Dell
A federal appeals court ruled Thursday that
a judge was wrong when he declared a
century-old ban on corporate campaign
contributions
In
federal
elections
unconstitutional.
U.S. District Judge James Cacheris ruled last
year that the ban violates corporations' freespeech rights. In his first-of-its kind ruling,
Cacheris said it was not logical for an
individual to be able to donate up to $2,500
while a corporation "cannot donate a cent."
Cacheris based his decision on the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark 2010 Citizens
United decision, which struck down a
prohibition against corporate spending on
campaign activities by independent groups,
such as ads by third parties to favor one side.
However, the Citizens United ruling left
untouched the ban on direct contributions to
candidates, the appeals court noted.
The lower court viewed independent
expenditures and direct contributions the
same, saying both are political speech, but
the appeals court said they must be regulated
differently.
"The reason for this difference in scrutiny is
clear:
independent
expenditures,
by
definition, are direct means by which
political speech enters into the marketplace,"
Judge Roger Gregory wrote. "Direct
contributions, conversely, do not necessarily
fund political speech but must be
transformed into speech by an individual
other than the contributor."
The
Justice
Department
cited
the
government's
interest
in
preventing
corruption in defending the contribution

limit, and the appeals court agreed.
"Prevention of actual and perceived
corruption and the threat of circumvention
are firmly established government interests
that support regulations on campaign
financing," Gregory wrote.
The issue arose when William P. Danielczyk
Jr. and Eugene R. Biagi, who both live in the
Washington suburb of Oakton, Va., were
charged
with
illegally
funneling
contributions to Hillary Clinton's Senate and
presidential campaigns. The defendants,
officers with a corporation called Galen
Capital Group, allegedly persuaded dozens
of individuals to contribute to Clinton's
campaigns and reimbursed them with
company money. According to prosecutors,
they tried to cover their tracks by writing
"consulting fees" on the memo line of
reimbursement checks and by issuing the
checks for amounts larger than the
contributions.
Cacheris dismissed one count of the
indictment related to contributions to
Clinton's 2008 presidential bid, but the
ruling by the appeals court reinstates it.
Neither Jeffrey A. Lamken, attorney for
Danielczyk, nor Lee E. Goodman, attorney
for Biagi, immediately returned phone
messages.
The Justice Department said it was pleased
with the ruling.
Judges William Traxler and Judge Albert
Diaz joined in the panel's decision.
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"Several Clinton Fundraisers Now Facing Criminal Allegations"
Washington Post
February 21,2011
Dan Eggen
The indictment of a top Northern Virginia
fundraiser last week is the latest in a series
of criminal cases that have ensnared
campaign donors to Hillary Rodham
Clinton, who relied heavily on wealthy
bundlers in her failed 2008 bid for the
presidency.
Federal grand jury indictments handed up in
Alexandria allege that Galen Capital Group
Chairman William P. Danielczyk Jr. and his
treasurer illegally
reimbursed
nearly
$190,000 in donations to Clinton's 2006 and
2008 campaigns, sometimes with corporate
funds.
Under federal law, major fundraisers known
as bundlers are free to help solicit and
package what are known as conduit
contributions for favored candidates, but
they are not allowed to reimburse other
donors as a way to evade campaign finance
limits.
Employees of Galen Capital, including
Danielczyk and the other defendant in the
case, company treasurer Eugene R. Biagi,
gave more than $50,000 to Clinton's
campaigns for the Senate in 2006 and for the
White House in 2008, according to the
Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks
money in politics. Danielczyk helped raise
about $100,000 for the Clinton presidential
campaign, records show.
A number of major donors to Clinton, now
secretary of state, have faced criminal
allegations in connection with fundraising
scandals since she dropped out of the race
for the White House in 2008. Federal

prosecutors have mounted four major cases
involving six defendants, who together
helped raise more than $1.1 million for
Clinton's
presidential
and
senatorial
campaigns, records show.
None of the cases has revealed any
wrongdoing by Clinton or her top advisers,
and most of the money has been returned or
donated to charity. But Craig Holman,
government affairs lobbyist for the
watchdog group Public Citizen, said Clinton
effectively put her campaign at risk by
relying so heavily on wealthy bundlers to
help her raise money.
"When you turn to that traditional wealthy
donor base, you're going to run into a lot of
problems because they encompass the type
of people who know that big money buys
influence," Holman said.
The State Department referred questions to
people who worked on Clinton campaign,
who did not respond to requests for
comment Friday.
Perhaps the most well-known defendant
linked with Clinton was Norman Hsu, a
former top Democratic fundraiser who was
convicted in 2009 of campaign-finance
fraud for making nearly $100,000 in illegal
donations through "straw donors." Clinton
returned about $850,000 to more than 200
donors linked to Hsu, who also pleaded
guilty to separate fraud charges for bilking
investors in a Ponzi investment scheme.
In another case involving Clinton's
campaIgn In January, a former business
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manager for crime novelist Patricia
Cornwell pleaded guilty to lying about the
source of nearly $50,000 in donations to
Clinton. Prosecutors said Evan Snapper used
funds from Cornwell to reimburse donors
without the novelist's knowledge.
Another major Clinton fundraiser, New
York City investment banker Hassan
Nemazee, was sentenced to 12 years in
prison last year for defrauding banks of
nearly $300 million. Some of the funds were
given to Democratic politicians, including
Clinton, Barack Obama and Joseph R. Biden
Jr., court records showed.
Nemazee was national finance chairman for
Clinton's 2008 campaign and served as New
York finance chairman for the failed 2004
presidential bid by Sen. John F. Kerry (0Mass.).
Clinton, Obama and other politicians either
returned most ofNemazee's contributions or
donated them to charity after his arrest, court
records show. Hundreds of thousands of
dollars in other donations to charitable
foundations-including one headed by
Clinton's husband, former president Bill
Clinton-were forfeited to the government.
As the Nemazee case suggests, many
presidential candidates have had to grapple
with fundraising scandals over the years,
heightening calls from watchdog groups for
tighter campaign finance regulations. During
the George W. Bush administration, at least

half a dozen top Bush bundlers were caught
up in allegations of illegal fundraising,
influence peddling or other financial crimes,
including superlobbyist Jack Abramoff.
Holman noted that Obama so far has
avoided any major fundraising controversies
in connection with his 2008 campaign,
which broke new ground by relying more
heavily on small donations than previous
presidential runs.
But a major supporter of Obama's 2004
Senate campaign, Chicago businessman
Tony Rezko, was convicted of 16 felony
corruption charges in 2008 for shaking down
companies seeking state contracts in Illinois.
Republicans labeled Rezko as "Obama's
longtime friend and money man" because of
his past ties to the president, although
Obama had no connection to the criminal
case.
Obama gave past donations linked to Rezko
to charity. During the 2008 campaign,
Obama also
said
he
regretted
a
"boneheaded" decision in which he bought a
slice of property from Rezko to expand the
size of his Chicago house lot.
In the most recent case, Danielczyk and
Biagi are charged with conspiracy, illegal
reimbursement
of contributions
and
obstruction. A personal assistant to
Danielczyk has agreed to cooperate with
prosecutors in exchange for pleading guilty
to a lesser charge.
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"Corporate Contribution Ban Upheld"
Brennan Center for Justice Blog
July 2,2012
Shanna Reulbach
Amid the excitement over last week's health
care decision, the Fourth Circuit's major
campaign finance decision in a case called
United States v. Danielczyk received
relatively
little
attention.
However,
Danielczyk is a cmcially important case,
affirming the constitutionality of a
longstanding
federal
law
banning
corporations
from
giving
campaign
donations directly to candidates. The
opinion overturned a flawed lower court
decision-and limited the reach of Citizens
United.
The federal ban on corporate contributions,
now located in the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act, has been in force since
Congress passed the Tillman Act in 1907.
For more than a century, it has been one of
the core protections against cormption in our
democracy.
The Danielczyk case began when two
businessmen gave corporate money directly
to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential
campaign. During their trial, they argued
that after Citizens United, the ban on
IS
corporate
campaign
contributions
unconstitutional. In effect, they urged the
court to find that Citizens United invalidated
the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
F.E. C. v. Beaumont, which recently decided
that the very same ban was constitutional.
While the lower cOUli wrongly accepted this
argument, the FOUlih Circuit found that
Citizen United's reasoning is limited to
independent expenditures-the Citizens
United COUli expressly declined to disturb
any laws governing direct contributions.
Circuit Judge Gregory, writing for a three-

judge panel, refuted the proposition that the
'''corporations-are-equal-to-people'
logic
necessarily applies in the context of direct
contributions." In other words, nothing
about Citizens United weakens Beaumont's
holding that the government can ban
corporate campaign contributions in order to
prevent cormption and stop violations of
other campaign finance laws.
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit emphasized the different treatment
given to direct contributions versus
independent expenditures-a distinction that
dates back to the Supreme COUli's seminal
campaign finance case, B1Ickley v. Valeo. In
that 1976 case, the Court found that
independent expenditures implicate greater
First Amendment rights than campaign
contributions. This is because, as reaffirmed
in Beaumont, contributions "do not
necessarily fund political speech but must be
transformed into speech by an individual
other than the contributor." This cmcial
difference is at the heart of the Fourth
Circuit's correct decision in Danielczyk,
limiting the reasoning of Citizens United to
independent expenditures.
The Danielczyk court also resolved a
potential circuit split-another important
aspect of the decision. While the Second
Circuit, in Ognibene v. Parks, and the Ninth
Circuit, in Thalheimer v. City of San Diego,
recently upheld the federal corporate
contribution ban, the Virginia lower court
decision threatened to create the appearance
of unsettled law. According to some experts,
Danielczyk will "inevitably" be appealed to
the Supreme Court. But thankfully, without
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a circuit split, the high Court will not face
the same pressures to grant review.
And so, by affirming the corporate
contribution ban as a valid and meaningful
protection against corruption, and by

limiting the reach of Citizens United, the
Fourth Circuit took an important step
towards protecting U.S. democracy from
some of the most damaging effects of
corporate money in politics.
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"Corporate Campaign Spending Rights
Affirmed by High Court"
Bloomberg
June 26,2012
Greg Stohr and Julie Bykowicz
A divided u.s. Supreme Court threw out
Montana's ban on corporate campaign
spending in a reaffirmation of the 2010
decision that unleashed super-PACs and left
federal elections awash in money from big
spenders.
Deciding they didn't need to hear
arguments, the justices yesterday summarily
reversed a Montana Supreme Court decision
upholding the state's century-old ban. The
state court had ruled the law's limits could
stand for state elections even after Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, the
two-year-old Supreme Court ruling that let
corporations and unions spend unlimited
sums.

conclusion
that
corporate
campaIgn
spending is entitled to broad protection
under the First Amendment.

"Citizens United mistakenly overruled
longstanding cases that protected the
fairness and integrity of elections," White
House spokesman Eric Schultz said in a
statement yesterday. "Unfortunately, the
court today missed an opportunity to correct
that mistake."

The court's unsigned OpInIOn in the 5-4
ruling said the case asked whether Citizens
United applied to a state law. "There can be
no serious doubt that it does," the court said.

President Barack Obama criticized the
Citizens ruling in his 2010 State of the
Union address. He has since given his
blessing to a super-political action
committee supporting his re-election, saying
it is necessary to compete with Republican
challenger Mitt Romney. Obama campaign
aides have said they expect to be outspent by
Romney and his allies because of several
super-PACs backing him.

"Montana's arguments in support" of the
lower court ruling "either were already
rejected in Citizens United or fail to
meaningfully distinguish that case," the
opinion said.

More than 600 super-PACs have raised
more than $240 million and spent $133
million this election cycle, according to the
Politics,
a
Center
for
Responsive
nonpartisan research group in Washington.

The majority was identical to the 5-4
Citizens United decision, which altered the
national political landscape and opened the
way for campaign spending by outside
groups to more than double from the level
four years ago.

Nonprofit Organizations

Missed Opportunity

Nonprofit organizations that don't have to
repoli donors have spent at least $12.4
million in this election cycle so far,
according to the Sunlight Foundation, a
Washington-based group that promotes
campaign-finance disclosure.

The latest action makes clear the court's five
Republican appointees stand behind their

The expenditures by super-PACs and
nonprofits add up to more than twice what
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outside groups had spent by this point in the
2008 election cycle, according to the Center
for Responsive Politics.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said in
court papers that "to the extent that there has
been more speech in recent elections, that is
a First Amendment good, not an excuse to
resurrect a censorship regime." The business
trade group opposed the Montana law.
Outside spending on state and local raceswhich include judgeships, ballot measures
and gubernatorial and mayoral posts-is
more difficult to tally, in part because of
differing disclosure requirements and
deadlines.
The National Institute on Money in State
Politics, a campaign-finance research group
in Helena, Montana, said that in a sample of
20 states, spending by groups other than
candidates rose to $139 million in 2010
from $65 million in 2008.

U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, the
Republican Senate minority leader from
Kentucky, said in a statement the ruling is
"another important victory for freedom of
speech."
There has been "only minimal corporate
involvement in the 2012 election cycle,"
McConnell wrote in the statement and in a
brief filed in support of the group seeking to
toss out Montana's corporate political
spending ban.
Secret Donors

Those committees are required to repoli
donors; many nonprofit groups that also
spend money in elections may keep their
donors secret.
David Bossie, president of Citizens United,
the nonprofit behind the Supreme Court case
of the same name, said in a statement that
the Montana decision is "another win for the
First Amendment."

State Bans

Critics of the Citizens United ruling had
sought to leave room for spending bans at
the state level, saying they guard against
corruption.
"The states have a compelling interest in
preventing domination of state and local
elections
by
nonresident
corporate
interests," argued New York, joined by 21
other states and the District of Columbia, in
a court filing backing Montana in the case.
"The decision today says that other states
struggling to deal with corrupting political
spending are essentially handcuffed," Adam
Skaggs, senior counsel of the Brennan
Center's Democracy Program at the New
York University School of Law, said in an
interview. "The court has removed a
promising tool for states."

The five members of the Citizens United
majority-Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy,
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alitoremain on the court and made up the
majority in yesterday's decision. Dissenting
were Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
At the time of the 2010 Citizens United
ruling, 22 states had laws banning or
restricting spending by corporations and
unions, according to a report this month by
the Corporate Reform Coalition, made up of
75 organizations and individuals from goodgovernance groups, environmental groups
and organized labor. Those states generally
repealed their limits or declared that their
laws are unenforceable, according to the
report.
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Appearance of Corruption

Shell of Authority

The exception was Montana, which chose to
continue enforcing its corporate money ban.

When the law was enacted, "the state of
Montana and its government were operating
under a mere shell of legal authority, and the
real social and political power was wielded
by powerful corporate managers to further
their own business interests," the Montana
court majority said.

At issue in the Montana case was the
statement by the Citizens United majority
that corporate campaign expenditures "do
not give rise to corruption or the appearance
of corruption." That's an important
conclusion because the court has allowed
campaign-finance restrictions as a means of
fighting corruption.
Montana argued that local and state
elections are especially susceptible to
corruption from corporate spending.
The Supreme Court put a hold on the law in
February.
Montanans enacted the 1912 Corrupt
Practices Act by ballot initiative. In its 5-2
ruling upholding the law, the Montana
Supreme Court said the state had "unique
and compelling interests" in barring
corporate election spending. The majority
pointed to the so-called "copper king" battle
at the beginning of the 20th century, when
entrepreneur Augustus Heinze and the
Anaconda Co., controlled by Standard Oil,
used their money to vie for dominance of the
state's government.

The Montana law barred direct election
spending
by
corporations,
including
incorporated interest groups. Corporations
must establish traditional political action
committees, which can solicit voluntaty
contributions
from
employees.
The
committees were subject to contribution
limits and disclosure requirements.
The
challengers
included
American
Tradition Partnership Inc., described on its
website as opposed to "environmental
extremism," the Montana Shooting Sports
Association Inc., a gun rights and firearmssafety group, and Champion Painting Inc., a
painting and drywall business with a single
shareholder.
The case is American Tradition Partnership
v. Attorney General for the State of
Montana, 11-1179.
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"Has SCOTUS OK'd Campaign Dirty Tricks?"
Politico
July 10,2012
Rick Hasen
An obscure procedural order issued the day
after the Supreme Court's decision to uphold
President Barack Obama's health care law
got lost in the saturated media coverage of
the health ruling and the palace intrigue over
whether Chief Justice John Robelis switched
his vote and alienated his conservative
colleagues. Without comment or dissent, the
justices declined to hear Minnesota's appeal
of a federal appeals cOUli ruling in 281 Care
Committee v.
Arneson-holding that
Minnesota's law banning false campaign
speech about ballot measures is likely
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The result could be even nastier campaigns
and more political dirty tricks.
Minnesota had asked the Supreme Court to
hold its petition until the court decided
United States v. Alvarez, the so-called
"Stolen Valor" case. The court decided
Alvarez the same day as health care, striking
down as a free speech violation a federal law
making it a crime to falsely claim to be a
recipient of the Congressional Medal of
Honor.

Alvarez casts considerable doubt over when,
if ever, states can take actions to combat
false campaign statements and campaign
dirty tricks-including lying about the
location of a polling place or the voting date.
The cOUli could have used the 281 Care
Committee case to clear up the muddle next
term. But it just denied the petition.
Without new clarity, I expect anyone
charged with making election-related lies to
raise a First Amendment defense. Which
they just may win.

It's too bad the Supreme COUli didn't take
the 281 Care Committee case, because the
current uncertainty over false campaign
speech laws provides an opening for those
who might consider using political dirty
tricks in November. The government has a
compelling interest in stopping that kind of
voter suppression-even if we don't trust it
to police campaign statements.
Before Alvarez, the Supreme Court had
recognized certain categories of speech and
expression, like "fighting words," which
were not entitled to any First Amendment
protection. The U.S. government, defending
the Stolen Valor law in Alvarez, relied on
statements in earlier Supreme Court cases
suggesting that deliberately false speech is
similarly undeserving of First Amendment
protection.
Four justices, led by Justice Anthony
Kennedy,
rejected the
government's
argument, ruling that laws regulating lying
are subject to "strict scrutiny" under the
First Amendment-the court's toughest
standard of review, under which few laws
can survive. (The court did indicate that
celiain longstanding laws barring certain
false statements, like perjury laws, remained
constitutional. )
"Only a weak society," these four justices
concluded, "needs government protection or
intervention before it pursues its resolve to
preserve the truth. Truth needs neither
handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication."
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice
Elena Kagan, agreed with Kennedy's
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conclusion that even false speech is usually
entitled to some First Amendment
protection, and that the Stolen Valor law
was unconstitutional. But Breyer applied an
"intermediate scrutiny" test for laws
punishing false speech-determining a law's
constitutionality by balancing the speaker's
First Amendment rights against the
government's interest in preserving the truth
in particular contexts.

Breyer's opinion noted the special difficulty
of laws punishing false statements in the
context of political campaigns, where
prosecutors might use false campaign
speech laws for political reasons, going after
political opponents. In this area, the "risk of
censorious selectivity by prosecutors is . . .
high."
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"One Mystery, One Order on Elections"
SCOTUSblog
June 29, 2012
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court has left town for the
summer, and in doing so, has left the state of
West Virginia waiting in suspense over the
fate of a federal court ruling that would have
required its legislature to come up with new,
equal population districts for electing its
three members of the U.S. House of
Representatives this year. But the Court
has definitely put a stop, for this year's
elections, at least, to Arizona's plan to
require voters to prove they are U.S. citizens
before they may register to take part in
elections there.
The Justices have been weighing an appeal,
filed in March by West Virginia state
officials, challenging a three-judge District
Court lUling that ordered state legislators to
come up with new congressional districts, or
else that comt would do so itself. The state
officers' appeal raised a significant issue
over whether the Constitution now requires
that the difference in population between
House districts must either be absolutely
zero, or as close to that as possible. That is
what the District Court had declared, on the
theory that Census data and computer
science are now so refined that absolute
equality can be achieved.
On January 20, before that appeal actually
had arrived at the Court, the Justices put the
District Comt ruling on hold until the state
appeal could be filed, and resolved.
Preliminary briefing in the case was
completed on June 5, and the case was
scheduled for consideration by the Justices
at their private Conference on June 21. So
far as anyone in the public knows, the Court
has taken no action on the case, and the case

was not scheduled to be considered on
Thursday with the final Conference of the
Justices before the summer recess. There is
no word at the Court on what is happening
with the case.
It is not customary for the Court to leave a
case like that dangling over the summer
recess. And the underlying constitutional
dispute would not be resolved merely by the
stay order issued in January, although that
had the effect of putting into effect the plan
adopted by the legislature. The primary
election, using that plan, has been held, so
those districts will remain in effect for the
general election in November. That plan
was
found
unconstitutional
by
a
divided three-judge comt because the
majority of the judges said the legislature
either had to do better to come close to zero
variation, or else justify the failure to do so
with explicit reliance on public policy goals
served by the failure to achieve zero
variation.

The maximum variation between the largest
of the three districts and the smallest created
by the legislature-approved plan was .79
percent, or a deviation of a total of 4,871
persons from the ideal, equal population
figure of 617,665 for each of the three
districts. Of the nine different redistricting
plans that the legislature had considered,
seven had a lower total variation, while only
two had higher comparisons. The District
Court found that it would be possible to get
closer to zero, and that would be required,
unless remaining variations were explained
away.
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West Virginia officials contended in their
appeal that their state legislature has had a
long tradition of shying away from partisan
fights over the drawing of congressional
district lines, and has been in the habit, after
each Census is taken, in making as few
changes as necessary in the districting array.
While that case remains in an uncertain state
on the Court's docket, the Court has turned
aside a request by Arizona officials to
postpone a Ninth Circuit Court ruling
striking down an eight-year-old mandate
that voters must prove they are U.S. citizens
in order to get on the election registration
rolls. (The Justices issued that order on

Friday, over the dissent of Justice Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., but the order was overlooked in
the excitement over the Court's health care
decision.)
State officials III Arizona had asked the
Court to allow election aides to demand
proof of citizenship before registering any
individual to vote. The Ninth Circuit had
ruled in April that the citizenship proof
requirement conflicts with a 1993 federal
law passed to make it easier for individuals
to register to vote-the National Voter
Registration Act.
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"Party Challenge to Top 2 Primary Back to Supreme Court?"
Washington SecretalY of State Blog
April 19,2012
David Ammons

Washington Democrats and Libertarians are
asking the U.S. Supreme COUli to hear yet
another challenge of the state's popular Top
2 Primary. Various appeals have been
underway since voters approved the system
by a landslide eight years ago.
The open primary, which allows all voters to
select their favorite candidates for each
office, without regard to party label, has
been successfully used since 2008, when the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 to allow it.
The high court did leave open the possibility
of further challenge based on the way the
state administered the winnowing election.
Barring some unexpected development, the
state plans to use the Top 2 Primary on Aug.
7 to winnow the field for governor and other
statewide offices, Congress, the Legislature
and other offices. The two top vote getters
will advance to the General Election in
November, with no party guaranteed a
runoff spot.
Both the U.S. District Court and the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected
arguments by the Democratic, Republican
and Libertarian parties of Washington that
their constitutional rights are violated. The
Republicans have dropped out of the new
challenge. Just before the deadline late
Wednesday, the Democrats and Libertarians
filed separate requests that the high court
hear a further appeal.
Secretary of State Sam Reed, the state's
elections chief, expressed disappointment
that the Libertarians and Democrats persist
in their challenge. He said he's pleased that

Republicans have heeded the request he has
made repeatedly for all three parties to stop
challenging a voter-approved system that is
working well and producing good
candidates and officeholders.
"Our system, which is a model for
other states, really honors the way
Washingtonians want to vote - for
the person, not the party label. It
really fits our populist, independent
streak and allows people to split their
ticket, rather than be confined to one
party's candidates. The parties'
challenge of our old blanket-primary
led to our Top 2 system, with a very
unpopular detour to the Pick-a-Party
system that limited our primary
choices to a single party's line of
candidates.
"I hope the Supreme Court will
decline to take the case, and will
acknowledge that we followed the
court's road map for how to conduct
the primary as a nonpartisan,
winnow election that puts the voter
in the driver's seat."
Attorney General Rob McKenna, who
personally argued the original case before
the Supreme Court, said:
"The people of the state of
Washington have made it clear that
they suppOli a people's primary-not
a partisan primary.
"We've already argued this case all
the way to the U.S. Supreme Court129

and won. The Secretary of State's
office then followed the direction of
the court to ensure the Top 2 Primary
was instituted in a manner that
respects the parties' rights to
association while still honoring the
will of the people to vote for the
person not the patty.
"During these tough budget times,
it's unfortunate that we're still forced
to spend state tax dollars defending
the will of the people."
The Democrats, writing in their request to
the court, complained that the system gives
the parties no say in which candidate is
allowed to claim their label. They also said
the state hasn't been required to show that
disclaimers on the ballot are adequate
remedy for voter confusion. The disclaimer
essentially says that the candidate chooses
which patty they prefer, but that the party
may or may not endorse their candidacy.
Apart from the primary process, the parties
are able to "nominate" one or more
candidates for each office-their seal of
approval. Candidates may publicize that in
their yardsigns, Voter's Pamphlet and
advertising.
The system easily survived a constitutional
challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
handed down a 7-2 ruling back in March of
2008. The state has used the system ever
since, with polls showing heavy public
support. But the parties continue to argue
that the Top 2 system causes voter confusion
and thereby violates the parties' freedom of
association.
In January of last year, U.S. District Judge
John Coughenour dismissed challenges
brought by the parties over the way
Washington operates the primary. Reed and

Attorney General Rob McKenna called it a
major victory for the voters of Washington
and expressed hope that the case was
resolved at long last. But the parties decided
to appeal.
The judge said the state Elections Division
has carefully adopted the recommendations
of the high court, making it clear that
candidates "prefer" a particular party of their
designation, but that the patty mayor may
not endorse the candidate. Coughenour
dismissed the parties' contention that voters
are confused by the party references.
He said the system "does not create the
possibility of widespread confusion among
the reasonable, well-informed electorate."
The patties appealed to the 9th Circuit,
which handles cases from the West. Again,
the three-judge panel upheld Washington.
The Secretary of State, represented by
McKenna, and backed by the Washington
State Grange, promoters of the Top 2
Initiative 872, asked the appeals judges to
agree with the district judge that Washington
has carefully implemented the primary using
the roadmap suggested by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Voters are not confused by the
system and the high court already has said
the parties do not have a right to demand
that their favored candidates be identified,
they said.
In their latest filing, the Democrats said
"The 9th Circuit did not independently
analyze
whether,
as
implemented,
Washington's system is a reasonable,
politically neutral regulation that serves an
important regulatory interest when the
system provides potentially misleading or
inaccurate information." The party should be
allowed to object to use of its name in
conjunctions with the candidate's in state-
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sponsored publications, the Democrats said.
Libertarians concurred with the Democrats'
arguments, including their concerns about
unauthorized use of their party label or
trademark and their lack of authority to
"disavow false candidacies."

McKenna's attorneys will file reply briefs
later this spring; there is no clear timeline
for when the high court might say if the
justices will hear the case. Statistically, few
very cases are accepted for review. If it
were accepted, it likely would be heard
sometime next year.
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"New Target In Voter ID Battle: 1965 Voting Rights Act"
National Public Radio
August 2, 2012
Corey Dade
A landmark federal law used to block the
adoption of state voter identification cards
and other election rules now faces
unprecedented legal challenges.

The Justice Department has used the preclearance provision to reject several of the
plaintiffs' initiatives, including Texas' strict
voter 10 law.

A record five federal lawsuits filed this year
challenge the constitutionality of a key
provision in the Voting Rights Act. The
1965 statute prevents many state and local
governments from enacting new voter ID
requirements, redistricting plans and similar
proposals on grounds that the changes would
disenfranchise minorities.

Across the nation, legal battles are
escalating over a wave of state laws passed
in the past two years that impose photo 10
requirements, scale back early voting
periods and restrict voter-registration effOlis,
among other changes. The litigation has
become sharply partisan because the
changes could influence voter turnout in the
November elections. Voter ID laws have
been the most contentious, as nine of the 11
states that have passed photo ill laws have
Republican governors.

The plaintiffs, which include Alabama,
Florida and Texas, are aiming for the
Supreme COUli because some justices in a
previous ruling openly questioned the
continued need for patis of the Voting
Rights Act. The high court recently received
two of the cases on appeal and could take
them up in the fall term.
The three states, and two smaller
communities in Alabama and North
Carolina, want to regain autonomy over
their elections, which are under strict federal
supervision imposed by the Voting Rights
Act to remedy past discrimination.
The complaints ask the courts to strike down
the central provision in the law, known as
"pre-clearance,"
which
reqUlres
of
governments
with
a
history
discrimination to get federal permission to
change election procedures. Pre-clearance is
enforced throughout nine states and in
pOliions of seven others. Most of the
jurisdictions are in the South.

Proponents of the Republican-led initiatives
say their intent is to prevent voter fraud and
shore up the election system. Opponents,
mainly Democrats and voting and civil
rights groups, insist the measures are aimed
at suppressing turnout among minorities and
young people, who tend to vote for
Democratic
candidates.
The
Justice
Department has challenged many of these
measures in lawsuits filed under the Voting
Rights Act.
Challengers argue that they should no longer
be forced to comply with the pre-clearance
mandate because efforts to prevent
minorities from registering, voting or
winning elected office were abolished many
years ago.
"These jurisdictions have made enormous
strides in increasing minority patiicipation

132

in elections and voter registration, but also
in the election of minority officials," says
Washington attorney Michael Carvin. He
represents the plaintiffs in the Kinston, N.C.,
case, which is one of two jurisdictions that
have petitioned the Supreme Court.
Critics Question Methodology
Since its passage, judges have consistently
upheld the Voting Rights Act and Congress
has reauthorized it four times based on
determinations that discrimination in
elections continues. The civil rights law is
widely considered the most effective of its
kind in U.S. history.
But a push to scale back the statute gained
momentum from the last challenge before
the Supreme Couti, in 2009. The justices
declined to answer the constitutional
question but signaled that the law's future
isn't assured.
"In pati due to the success of that
legislation, we are now a very different
Nation," Chief Justice John Robelis wrote in
the majority opinion, adding that continued
enforcement "must be justified by current
needs."
Roberts was alluding to one of the strongest
criticisms of the pre-clearance provision and
one detailed in the federal complaints-that
enforcement is determined by a formula of
minority voting statistics from 1964, 1968
and 1972. The methodology fails to account
for decades of gains in minority voting and
representation in office.
Critics fault Congress for failing to update
the formula when it reauthorized the statute
in 2006 for another 25 years. Many state and
local officials believe that the use of current
figures would exempt most jurisdictions

from pre-clearance, as Alabama explained in
its complaint filed last week:
"[I]t is no longer constitutionally justifiable
arbitrarily impose
for Congress to
disfavored treatment on Alabama and other
covered jurisdictions by forcing them to
justify all voting changes to federal officials
... for another 25 years even though, if the
coverage formula were applied using 2000,
2004 and 2008 voter registration and
participation rates, Alabama would no
longer be covered."
Alabama has long chafed at compliance and,
in 1965, was the first jurisdiction to
challenge the Voting Rights Act. The
Supreme Court ruled against the state.
But supporters credit pre-clearance, as the
enforcement arm of the law, with breaking
the most blatant and unrepentant systems of
discrimination.
"It has been extraordinarily successful at
changing people's habits," says veteran civil
rights attorney Armand Derfner of South
Carolina, who has successfully argued
voting rights cases before the Supreme
Court. He represents the League of Women
Voters in a lawsuit against South Carolina's
voter ID law. "I think a lot of public officials
actually like pre-clearance because it keeps
the government bodies on their toes."

Clearest Impact in the South
Most data show minority voter participation,
both in registration and balloting, has
gradually increased since the 1960s.
The Pew Research Center says the 2008
elections had the most diverse U.S.
electorate, as nonwhites made up nearly 24
percent. Whites' share of total turnout
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dropped 3 percentage points from 79 percent
in 2004.
Black turnout reached a record 65 percent in
2008, compared with 55 percent in 1988,
according to the Pew study. Driven by
Barack Obama's presidential campaign,
blacks voted at the same rate as whites for
the first time.
The greatest impact of the Voting Rights
Act is clear among blacks in the South.
In the 1964 presidential election, 72 percent
of blacks in the Northeast, Midwest and
West voted, according to the Census Bureau.
Only 44 percent of blacks in the South cast
ballots.
By 2008, black turnout in the South reached
63 percent, surpassing black turnout in all

other regions, the Census data show.
"No rational person can think the South of
today looks anything like the South of the
1960s," Carvin says. "There's no cognizable
difference between the South and other
jurisdictions. "
Increased minority voting also has boosted
minority representation in local, state and
federal elected offices.
More than 10,500 blacks held elected posts
last year, compared with 1,469 in 1970,
according to the National Roster of Black
Elected Officials.
The number of elected Hispanics reached
5,850 last year, a gain of 87 percent since
1984, according to the National Association
of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials.
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"Legal Battles Erupt Over Tough Voter ID Laws"
The New York Times
July 19,2012
Ethan Bronner

Four years ago as Viviette Applewhite, now
93, was making her way through her local
Acme supermarket, her pocketbook hanging
from her shoulder, a thief sliced the bag
from its straps.
A
former
hotel
housekeeper,
Ms.
Applewhite, who never had a driver's
license, was suddenly without a Social
Security card. Adopted and twice married,
she had several name changes over the
years, so obtaining new documents was
complicated. As a result, with Pennsylvania
now requiring a state-approved form of
photo
identification
to
vote,
Ms.
Applewhite, a supporter of President
Obama, may be forced to sit out
November's election for the first time in
decades.
Incensed, and spurred on by liberal groups,
Ms. Applewhite and others like her are suing
the state in a closely watched case, one of a
number of voter-identification suits across
the country that could affect the
participation of millions of voters in the
presidential election.
"They're trying to stop black people from
voting so Obama will not get re-elected,"
Ms. Applewhite said as she sat in her
modest one-bedroom apaIiment in the
Germantown section of Philadelphia,
reflecting a common sentiment among those
who oppose the law. "That's what this
whole thing is about."
Whether true or not, the focus on what
Democrats call "voter suppression" is
accelerating as the Nov. 6 election looms.

Last week, Texas took the Obama
administration to federal court because it
blocked a voter identification law there on
racial discrimination grounds. In Florida,
officials successfully sued for access to a
federal database of noncitizens in hopes of
purging them from voter rolls, a move
several other states plan to emulate.
Advocates say the laws have nothing to do
with voter suppression and are about
something else entirely: ensuring the
integrity of elections, preventing voter fraud
and improving public confidence in the
electoral process in an era when photo
identification is routine for many basic
things, including air travel.
Thirty-three states have passed laws
requiring identification for voting. FivePennsylvania, Indiana, Kansas, Tennessee
and Georgia-have what are called strict
photo identification requirements, meaning
voters must present specific kinds of photo
IDs before voting. Six states-Michigan,
South Dakota, Idaho, Louisiana, Hawaii and
Florida-have
less
strict
photo
requirements, meaning voters may be able to
sign affidavits or have poll workers who
recognize them verify their identities.
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said last
week of the Texas statute, "We call those
poll taxes," a reference to fees that were
once used in some Southern states to prevent
blacks from voting. He said that while 8
percent of whites do not have the type of
documentation that would be required by the
Texas election law, the percentage among
blacks is triple that.
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Opponents of the laws note that nearly every
state legislature that has passed them in the
past two years is Republican-run and that
those most affected are minority groups and
the urban poor, constituencies that tend to
vote Democratic.
In a report issued on Wednesday, the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law said it had found
that obtaining proper voter identification in
the affected states was difficult. More than
10 million eligible voters live more than 10
miles from their nearest ID-issuing office,
and many of the offices maintain limited
hours, the repOli said. Moreover, it said,
despite pledges to make voter identification
free, bilih and marriage certificates, often
needed for the process, cost $8 to $25, and
many affected voters are poor.
The argument by the Pennsylvania law's
proponents that it has nothing to do with
patiisan politics took a blow late last month
when Mike Turzai, the majority leader of the
state's House of Representatives, addressed
a group of fellow state Republicans. Listing
the accomplishments of the Republicancontrolled legislature, he said, "Voter IDwhich is going to allow Governor Romney
to win the state of Pennsylvania-done."
In Wisconsin, a voter identification
requirement has been declared to be in
violation of the state Constitution, but that
ruling is expected to be appealed. Some
Southern states, like Texas and South
Carolina, have to clear any voting law
changes with the Department of Justice
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The
department has rejected their identification
requirements as discriminatory, and this past
week Texas has been challenging that ruling
in federal court in Washington. In
September, South Carolina will take its case
against the depaliment to court.

One of the most closely watched cases is
here in Pennsylvania, where polls show a
tight race shaping up between Mr. Obama
and Mitt Romney, the former Massachusetts
governor.
"We don't know whether voter fraud is a
huge or a small problem, but we believe the
new law will preserve the integrity of every
vote," said Ronald G. Ruman, spokesman
for the Pennsylvania Department of State.
"The goal is to make sure that every vote
cast counts."
Supporters also point to accusations that
Acorn, a community organizing group that
worked to register minority group members,
was engagmg m voter registration fraud
several years ago.
This month, the Pennsylvania Depatiment of
State estimated that 759,000 registered
voters may be at risk of not having the
required identification. It promised to send a
letter to each one explaining what needed to
be done.
"Obama won Pennsylvania in 2008 by
600,000 votes," said Witold Walczak, legal
director of the American Civil Liberties
Union of Pennsylvania, which is leading the
challenge to the law. "What is most galling
is to hear the law's proponents argue that
one person voting improperly undermines
the integrity of the election. What about all
the people prevented improperly from
voting? Doesn't that undermine the integrity
of the election?"
When the trial against the law statis this
month in the capital, Harrisburg, Mr.
Walczak will put on the stand a number of
Pennsylvanians with cases like Ms.
Applewhite's, asseliing that they are unable
to meet the requirements in time for the
November election.
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Among them will be Wilola Shinholster
Lee, a 60-year-old retiree who was born in
Georgia and has been unable to replace her
birth celiificate, which was lost in a house
fire. Officials in Georgia told her that they
too had suffered a fire and no longer had a
record of her birth.

fraud, the law did not pose an undue burden
on voters. But the case in Pennsylvania is
based on the state Constitution, which is
more specific than the federal Constitution
about the right to vote. The Pennsylvania
law also has tighter restrictions than the one
in Indiana.

"I came here when Twas 5 with my
grandmother, who worked as a domestic,"
Ms. Lee said. "She's 98 and doesn't have a
photo ID either. She's upset because she
loves Obama."

Stewali 1. Greenleaf, a Republican state
senator in Pennsylvania and chairman of the
judiciary committee, said in an interview in
Harrisburg that he opposed the law because
it was unnecessary given how uncommon
in-person voter fraud has been. That will be
a central argument in the lawsuit as well.

Ms. Lee has a Social Security card and an
employee photo identification from her
years working for the Philadelphia Board of
Education. But without her birth certificate,
she is unlikely to be able to vote in
November.
In 2008, the Supreme COUli upheld
Indiana's voter identification law, saying
that although there was little evidence of

Mr. Walczak of the civillibeliies union said:
"The real danger from this law will come
from people who don't even know it exists
or who think they have the right TD but
don't. Our position is that we will not know
until Election Day how big a problem it is,
and then it will be too late."
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